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 FORWORD
FOREWORD
Will China lead? Or will it follow? For much of human history China led the world in 
science and technology. Western stereotypes of a backward and unchanging China 
obscured much more of that history than they illuminated. Indeed as the historian Joseph 
Needham showed in his extraordinary accounts, Chinese scientific civilisation was rich, and 
dynamic in many fields.
Yet during and after the industrial revolution China slipped far behind. It is only in the last 
few decades that it has once again caught up. Now, as this report makes clear, change is 
happening very fast. But the picture is complex. It’s true that China has primarily excelled at 
adopting technologies from elsewhere, as a ‘fast follower’ rather than a leader. But in some 
fields it is on the frontier of technological knowledge, and the growth of published research 
is extraordinary. It’s true that China remains highly dependent on connections to pioneers 
elsewhere in the world – and is lower down the global value chains than it would like. But 
its own capacity is developing fast, with 25 per cent of the world’s R&D workforce and 
many Chinese multinationals now high in league tables of research spending and results. 
As this report shows, a distinctively Chinese approach to innovation can now be seen in 
many sectors. It involves not only absorbing the best ideas from around the world but also 
recasting them and recombining them through ‘re–innovation’. Some of that is the result of 
classic R&D. But much involves what Nesta has called ‘hidden innovation’ – the innovation 
in design, processes and organisational models in manufacturing and services which isn’t 
captured by the traditional measures of R&D. 
This is an important report for Nesta. Over the last few years we have been doing more 
to map ‘innovations in innovation’ around the world. In technology as in so many other 
things, we live in a multipolar world and it’s no longer enough to learn from familiar places 
like Silicon Valley or the German industrial heartlands. That’s why we have developed 
partnerships not just in China but also in India, Brazil, the US, Europe and elsewhere.
Continuous innovation in innovation is a response to the diminishing returns that seem to 
afflict any tool used to accelerate the creation and spread of ideas. What worked in one era 
to create new pharmaceuticals or transfer technology out of universities, may not work so 
well 20 years later. So policymakers, just like businesses, have no choice but to constantly 
renew and reinvent their methods, and the ones that are agile and fast to learn from others, 
are the ones that will succeed. 
The other imperative described in this report is partnership – becoming better at 
collaboration for mutual advantage. The UK has now overtaken Japan to become second 
only to the US in the number of its joint research publications with China. Some of what 
is happening in China is challenging to the UK and others. It means tougher competition. 
But there will also be many new opportunities for collaboration. This report sets out a road 
map for making the most of them.
Geoff Mulgan 
Chief Executive, Nesta
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A great deal of speculation surrounds China’s prospects in science and innovation, as with 
other aspects of China’s development and heightened visibility on the global stage. The 
same pitfalls – of hype, generalisation and only partial awareness of the domestic political, 
economic and cultural context – mean that discussion of this topic in Europe and the US 
can sometimes obscure as much as it illuminates. 
China’s innovation system is advancing so rapidly in multiple directions that the UK needs 
to develop a more ambitious and tailored strategy, able to maximise opportunities and 
minimise risks across the diversity of its innovation links to China. For the UK, the choice is 
not whether to engage more deeply with the Chinese system, but how.
Innovation is caught up in a bigger unfolding debate about the pace, scale and direction of 
China’s economic and political reforms. Much still depends upon the playing out of a set of 
tensions: between the planned economy and the market; national and global priorities; the 
hardware of research infrastructure and the software of culture and ethics; the skills and 
creativity of home–grown talent, and the entrepreneurialism and networks of returnees. 
In the decades to come, China is likely to change innovation just as much as innovation 
changes China.
Our report
This report analyses the policies, prospects and dilemmas for Chinese research and 
innovation over the next decade. It is designed to inform a more strategic approach 
to supporting China–UK collaboration. With the recent once in a decade leadership 
transition, and a review of China’s Medium and Long–term National Plan for Science and 
Technology Development 2006–2020 (MLP) now underway, Nesta and its partners – the 
UK’s Department for Business Innovation and Skills, the Foreign Office – BIS Science 
and Innovation Network and Research Councils UK – were keen to review how China’s 
innovation system has changed over recent years.
To do this, we analysed over 600 policy documents, reports, statistical digests and articles 
(in English and Chinese) to capture the current state of knowledge, scholarship and debate. 
We commissioned new data from Thomson Reuters to shed light on the health of UK–
China collaborative research. We held three expert workshops in London and Beijing. We 
also carried out in–depth interviews with experts and stakeholders across government, 
academia, SMEs and multinational corporations in the UK and China as well as Germany, 
Australia and the US. 
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Ten key findings
1. China is an absorptive state, increasingly adept at attracting and profiting from 
global knowledge and networks. China’s growing innovation system has succeeded 
in combining rapidly improving home–grown capabilities and infrastructure with 
foreign technologies and knowledge to build the world’s fastest supercomputer, send 
astronauts into space and pioneer the Beidou Satellite Navigation System. These 
examples suggest that what China’s President Xi Jinping terms “innovation with 
Chinese characteristics” will not be a straightforward path from imported to home–
grown innovation, but a messier process in which the lines between Chinese and non–
Chinese ideas, technologies and capabilities are harder to draw.
Characterising China as an absorptive state helps us to understand its current phase of 
development: that the systemic conditions for research and innovation have reached a 
stage where ideas can be effectively absorbed and exploited, with increasingly dense 
and targeted networks to enable this. But it also helps us assess the prospects for future 
development: absorption will remain a core strand of national research and innovation 
policy, and Chinese firms’ impressive ability to rapidly absorb and re–innovate, while 
adding novelty and value to ideas and technologies in the process, is crucial to 
understanding their competitiveness. 
2. Accelerating the shift to a more innovative economy remains a core priority of 
China’s new leadership, yet equally important is a new focus on quality, efficiency 
and evaluation. A policy focus since the early 1990s on investment and growth has 
propelled China into the top ranks of global innovation, but the process has been 
inefficient and these policies are now being complemented by a growing focus on 
efficiency, quality, coordination and evaluation. This trajectory of reform is likely to be 
consolidated in the 2016 13th Five Year Plan.
3. The exceptional growth trajectory of China’s research base continues, but has not yet 
been matched by similar leaps in quality. Growth in output is pervasive throughout 
the system, both in large fields such as engineering and in newer fields such as 
biomaterials, which grew 15–fold in the last decade. Impact remains below world 
average in most areas, but is close to that benchmark in a number of fields, including 
engineering and mathematics, and consistently above average in agriculture. The 
strengths of established research economies like the UK are relatively stable from year 
to year, while China’s are changing at an unprecedented rate. This requires a cautious 
approach to interpreting strengths and weaknesses. Spikes of excellence and pools of 
mediocrity can be hidden among the averages.
4. Research and innovation is still highly concentrated on China’s east coast, but diverse 
models of innovation are visible among east coast hotspots. While some second 
tier inland cities such as Chengdu and Wuhan have benefited from government and 
multinational investment in innovation, well over two–thirds of all patents were granted 
to applicants on the east coast in 2011. In addition, the east coast accounted for over 
60 per cent of China’s publication output. Yet among the eastern hotspots of Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou, there are contrasting innovation models. While the central 
government sets the overall policy context, targets and evaluation metrics, there is a 
considerable degree of autonomy in how to deliver on these goals in different places, 
leading to experimentation through different interpretations of national policies. 
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5. Over the last five years, an expanding tier of Chinese multinationals have become 
visible in global rankings of firm–level innovation. Both Baidu and Tencent appear in 
the top 50 of Forbes’ list of most innovative companies and ZTE applied for more PCT 
patents than any other company in the world in 2012. China has benefited considerably 
from the fragmentation and modularisation of global production, which has allowed 
its enterprises to specialise within particular niches of product and service value 
chains. Businesses are responsible for almost three–quarters of China’s R&D spend, but 
progress towards an enterprise–led innovation system has been inhibited by the slow 
pace of reform in state–owned enterprises. 
6. Previously regarded as a weakness, the quality and speed of China’s capacity for 
incremental re–innovation is now an important competitive asset. Sophisticated 
manufacturing networks excel in absorbing, adapting, prototyping and market testing 
new products and technologies at speed. ‘Shanzhai’ methods of production previously 
referred only to substandard imitation, but as former shanzhai companies have 
developed disruptive products, this method of innovation is of growing international 
interest as a distinctive way of adding value. These approaches are not only prevalent 
in manufacturing, but also in the digital and creative industries.
7. After three decades of rapid economic growth, debate in China is intensifying about 
how to direct innovation towards social and environmental goals. Environmental 
and health concerns are prompting a sharper focus on low–carbon and sustainable 
innovation and the government is investing heavily in low–carbon cities, renewable 
energy and energy efficiency programmes. A more proactive and vocal civil society 
is at the forefront of growing calls for social innovation. More demanding Chinese 
consumers are driving new types of user–driven innovation, a process which will 
intensify as domestic consumption takes over from investment as the main driver of 
China’s economic growth.
8. Our new analysis shows that in 2011, the UK overtook Japan to become second only 
to the US in the number of its joint research publications with China. The UK has 
increased its share of China’s collaborative activity while other EU countries have 
declined. This is an encouraging sign but a weak predictor of future performance, 
owing to the speed of change within the Chinese system. For any country seeking to 
collaborate with China, ensuring a density and diversity of connections will be crucial, 
spanning the academic, research, commercial, trade and cultural spheres. 
9. There is no perfect formula for high impact collaborations with China. There is very 
little evidence available on the effectiveness and economic impact of different models 
of support for international innovation collaboration. Each county’s strengths and 
modes of engagement are unique, and while it is important to monitor and benchmark 
the UK’s performance against that of other countries, and learn from other countries’ 
experiences, the transfer of ‘best practices’ in collaboration is rarely straightforward. 
For instance the US and German approaches to collaborating with China are frequently 
held up as models for the UK to emulate. However, the UK’s economy and military 
might is substantially different from that of the US and its manufacturing base 
contrasts with the one which forms the foundation of the Sino-German relationship.
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10. The greatest ‘China risk’ for innovative companies is focussing too heavily on 
downside risks, and missing out on the opportunities that China presents. Hawkish 
perspectives on Chinese innovation highlight the ‘dark side’ of China’s absorptive state: 
international flows of ideas and technology resulting from IP theft, forced technology 
transfer and hacking. But innovative firms recognise that without some risk, there is 
little reward. Intellectual property is only as valuable as one’s capacity to exploit it 
and stay ahead of the competition. The increasingly absorptive Chinese system brings 
both risks and opportunities for businesses, universities and others seeking to work 
with and in China. These risks need to be managed with care, but they should not be 
over–emphasised to the extent that they eclipse a far greater risk – that of failing to 
participate fully and benefit from the next phase of China’s growth.
Recommendations
1. The UK should develop a new five–year strategy for China–UK collaboration in 
research and innovation.
Work towards this strategy should begin now, but 2016 would be the ideal time to 
publish it, to take account of new policies in China’s 13th FYP, and the 2015 post–
election Spending Review in the UK. The strategy should encompass the full breadth 
of potential innovation links between the two systems, from research through to the 
commercialisation, demonstration and scaling phases of new technologies. Some 
programmes should envisage a horizon of decades rather than years, and this strategy 
should be fully embedded in a long–term plan for innovation–led economic growth 
in the UK. Stable long-term investments and incentives should help experimental 
approaches to collaboration flourish. On the UK side, this process will require the active 
involvement of the Technology Strategy Board and a wide range of industrial and 
business partners in addition to BIS and RCUK.
2. The UK should develop more sophisticated methods and metrics for identifying 
China–UK innovation opportunities and for evaluating impact.
The strategy should look beyond readily measurable research performance and 
patenting data to understand China’s evolving specialisms. It should explore how 
UK companies can better engage with China’s strengths in developing, iterating and 
scaling technologies. The UK should develop approaches to supporting ecosystems 
of collaboration rather than individual companies. The UK’s ‘eight great technologies’ 
should form the basis of a mapping exercise to determine specific China–UK 
complementarities, which should feed into the five–year strategy. Bibliometric data 
should be used to expand and diversify research collaborations, by developing a real–
time data resource for UK researchers, identifying the range of Chinese universities 
where they can find relevant capacity and competence. One of the strengths of UK 
innovation policy is the high degree of openness and debate about the effectiveness of 
different approaches. Much equivalent debate and analysis takes place on the Chinese 
side, but is often difficult to access online. The UK government should encourage 
Chinese counterparts to promote access to data and analysis on innovation policy in the 
same way the UK has on the gov.uk website.
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3. Expand the China–UK innovation policy dialogue to include a new bilateral expert 
group, able to undertake in–depth analysis to inform ministerial meetings.
China and the UK should expand their existing innovation policy dialogue to establish 
a group of Chinese and UK experts in research, innovation and industrial policy, able 
to explore themes relevant to collaboration and provide input and advice to official 
discussions. This group could analyse emerging policies and what they mean for 
each country, evaluate programmes and methods used to support collaboration, 
and assess Chinese and UK strengths and weaknesses for areas of complementarity. 
Crucially, the work of the group should be published, to inform public debate on UK–
China collaboration. Focused analysis could also be undertaken under priority themes 
spanning research and innovation, for example: 
• Ageing and healthcare: Both countries face the challenge of caring for an expanding 
elderly population with a dwindling workforce. Innovations in health technology, and 
systemic approaches to transformation could be explored.
• Smart and sustainable cities: China has been investing heavily in smart and eco–
cities, and efforts have been made to match Chinese demand to UK strengths 
in design, construction and big data. But this is an area that can only grow in 
importance given the pace of urbanisation in China and Chinese excellence in 
materials science and engineering.
• Creative industries: China is now making significant investments in cultural 
institutions and creative industries, and is a huge potential market for the UK. 
Creative industries are an area of great strength for UK innovation and there are 
considerable unexploited opportunities for collaboration.
4. Further boost the UK’s presence and capacity in China to coordinate innovation 
diplomacy and collaboration for greatest economic and social impact. 
The UK needs to invest further to ensure it can sustain the full range of activities 
required for an effective approach to innovation diplomacy that will unlock long–term 
economic opportunities for the UK. This will require brokers and intermediaries capable 
of supporting a full spectrum of relationships. They should recognise when to support 
individual or supply chain–based collaborative efforts and when to shift attention 
to transforming the macro policy environment. They also need to ensure better 
coordination between UK partners in China. As the global innovation system develops, 
the UK should design more targeted policies to increase its own capacity to absorb, 
develop and exploit knowledge as well as to generate it. The proposed expert group 
should work closely with UK representatives on the ground to gather data and identify 
opportunities and draw lessons from effective practices.
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1. CHINA’S ABSORPTIVE STATE
As the global competition in national strength is heating up, 
we should unswervingly go down the path of innovation with 
Chinese characteristics.” 
President Xi Jinping, 5 March 20131 
Deep inside China’s National University of Defence Technology, on the outskirts of 
Changsha, a computer is whirring. But this is no ordinary machine. With 3.1 million Intel 
Core processors, 1.4 petabytes of RAM, and the capacity to perform 33,860 trillion 
calculations per second, it is the fastest supercomputer on the planet. 
In June 2013, China surprised observers by seizing the number one spot in the TOP500, 
a twice yearly ranking of the world’s fastest supercomputers.2 The Tianhe–2 (Or Milky 
Way–2) was successfully tested almost two years ahead of schedule. Funded by the 
Chinese government’s 863 High Technology Program, with additional support from 
Guangdong province, it will eventually be deployed at the National Supercomputer Centre 
in Guangzhou, where it will be used by researchers from across southern China. 
Tianhe–2 is the most impressive result to date of a well–funded and highly–targeted drive 
by China to move to the fore of supercomputing. It has knocked the US Department of 
Energy’s Titan machine off the number one position, and although the US still dominates 
the TOP500 (occupying 252 places in the table, including five in the top ten), China with 66 
places is catching up fast.
The race is now on to see which country will be first to reach exascale: by producing a 
supercomputer capable of one quintillion calculations per second. The US, EU, Japan, 
India and Russia all have ambitions and substantial research programmes directed towards 
this goal. But most experts expect China to get there first. In his 2011 State of the Union 
address, President Obama warned that “This is our generation’s Sputnik moment”, as he 
highlighted supercomputing as one of several fields where the US was in danger of falling 
behind, and appealed to Congress for more investment in research. Two years on, an 
exascale strategic plan has only just been submitted to the US Congress, and the prospects 
for new funding remain uncertain.3
In one sense, Tianhe–2 is an achievement that the Americans should be every bit as proud 
of as the Chinese. It is built using Intel chips, and Intel remains a US company, carrying out 
a lot of its most valuable R&D in California and other US locations. So while the Chinese 
media lauded Tianhe–2 as an ‘independently–developed’ technology,4 some users of the 
social media platform Weibo remained sceptical.5 However, TOP500 editor Jack Dongarra 
points out that “Most of the features of (Tianhe–2) were developed in China, and they are 
only using Intel for the main compute (processor) part…the interconnect, operating system, 
front–end processors and software are mainly Chinese.”6 Most analysts agree that it won’t 
be long before China’s produces its first fully home–grown supercomputer. 
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One way of understanding this trajectory is through the concept of ‘introduce, digest, 
absorb and re–innovate.’ This concept featured prominently in China’s Medium and 
Long–term National Plan for Science and Technology Development (MLP), which was 
published in 2006 and remains the primary blueprint for innovation policy until 2020.7 
Supercomputing is just one of many priority areas in which foreign technologies are being 
absorbed, adapted and eventually improved. The same process occurred with several of 
the technologies that China is most proud of, including its high–speed rail network, nuclear 
reactors and the Shenzhou spacecraft. 
The example of Tianhe–2 suggests that what China’s President Xi Jinping terms “innovation 
with Chinese characteristics” will not be a straightforward path from imported to home–
grown innovation, but a messier process in which the lines between Chinese and non–
Chinese ideas, technologies and capabilities are harder to draw. In this report, we argue 
that China can now best be characterised as an ‘absorptive state’, increasingly adept 
at attracting and profiting from global knowledge and networks alongside its more 
supportive environment for indigenous research and development.
Taking stock
A great deal of speculation surrounds China’s prospects in science and innovation, as 
with other aspects of China’s development and heightened visibility on the global stage. 
And the same pitfalls – of hype, generalisation and only partial awareness of the domestic 
political, economic and cultural context – means that discussion of this topic in Europe and 
the US can sometimes obscure as much as it illuminates. 
There is no denying that China is becoming a more significant force in science and 
innovation. It continues to invest rapidly: in 2012, China’s total R&D expenditure exceeded 
¥1 trillion RMB ($163 billion USD). In his end of term address, outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao 
highlighted the 18 per cent year–on–year increase in China’s research spending since 2008; 
a period when the after–effects of the global financial crisis have seen investment flatline 
or fall in many OECD countries. China is gradually redesigning the policies, institutions and 
incentives required to stimulate innovation in academia, business and the public sector. 
And it is drawing heavily on the lessons, experiences and capabilities of other countries in 
this process, both through international collaborations and by encouraging the return of its 
high–skilled diaspora. 
It is hard to assess an innovation system that is changing so quickly, but this is a good 
moment to attempt such an exercise. In the past year, China has completed its once in a 
decade transition to its new leadership, and the Chinese government has embarked on a 
mid–term evaluation of the 2006 Medium and Long–term National Plan for Science and 
Technology Development 2006–2020 (MLP). President Xi has reaffirmed the high–level 
objectives of that plan but, as a recent commentary in the journal Science describes, “There 
is growing anxiety among Chinese political and scientific leaders that, despite more money, 
better–trained talent, and sophisticated equipment, the domestic innovation system is still 
underperforming.”8 Further reform of the innovation system is likely to receive attention in 
the next five–year plan. While research for the 13th Five Year Plan is already underway, the 
contours of any new policies are not yet clear. 
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The context for this report
Over the past decade, UK policymakers, universities and businesses have been proactive 
in supporting research and innovation links with China, with often impressive results. Yet it 
can still be a challenge for UK stakeholders to navigate the Chinese innovation system and 
identify the connections that will yield the greatest mutual benefit.
The aim of this report is to analyse the policies, prospects and dilemmas for Chinese 
innovation over the next decade, in order to inform a more strategic approach to China–UK 
collaboration. Nesta and its partners – the UK’s Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Science and Innovation Network, and Research 
Councils UK – were also keen to update the findings of an earlier 2007 study, published by 
the think tank Demos.9 With the Chinese government now reviewing its Medium and Long–
term National Plan for Science and Technology Development (the publication of which 
provided the immediate context for the 2007 Demos study) this report focuses on how 
China’s innovation system has changed in the seven years since the MLP was published. 
There is no shortage of research, commentary and analysis of different aspects of Chinese 
innovation, but comprehensive external assessments of its innovation system are more 
unusual, and are now quite challenging to undertake given the sheer scale of activity. A 
notable exception was a major OECD review completed in 2007.10 This report builds on that 
OECD review, the 2007 Demos report, and a host of Chinese and international studies.
During ten months of research, we analysed over six hundred policy documents, reports, 
statistical digests and articles (in English and Chinese) to capture the current state of 
knowledge, scholarship and debate. We commissioned fresh bibliometric data from 
Thomson Reuters to shed light on the health of UK–China collaborative research. We held 
three expert workshops: two at Nesta in London with academics, civil servants from BIS 
and the Foreign Office and representatives of the UK’s intellectual property office, and 
a third at CASTED11 in Beijing. We also carried out in–depth interviews with experts and 
stakeholders across government, academia, SMEs and multinational corporations in the UK 
and China as well as Germany, Australia and the USA. 
The many faces of Chinese innovation
In this chapter, we start by outlining five established narratives about Chinese innovation 
that have influenced debates in China and beyond. None of these offers a complete picture, 
or tells the full story. But each says something useful about China’s progress in innovation, 
and sheds light on pathways for the future. We then introduce and explain our sixth 
narrative, from which this report takes its title: that of China as an absorptive state.
• China as a science and innovation superpower
This was the starting point for the 2007 Demos report. China’s growing strengths – and 
likely or inevitable dominance – as a force in global science and innovation is often 
the way its prospects are framed, usually on the basis of a fairly crude reading of the 
bibliometric data and assumptions of continued growth.12 UNESCO’s assessment in 
its 2010 World Science Report is one example: ‘China is a hair’s breadth away from 
counting more researchers than either the USA or the European Union, for instance, 
and now publishes more scientific articles than Japan.’13 A recent survey of European 
business leaders by Accenture found that over two–thirds thought China would draw 
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level or pull ahead of Europe in innovation by 2023.14 Such predictions are often 
accompanied by laments for a perceived decline, or existential threat, to the strength 
of US or European science.15 Arguably such accounts tell us more about economic or 
cultural insecurities, or domestic battles for research funding, in other nations than 
they do about China. There are also plenty of commentators who maintain that the 
US, in particular, can maintain its strengths despite China’s rise.16 But clearly, if you look 
purely at the quantity of scientific papers, as a proxy for research strength, then China 
will outstrip the US by around 2020, and perhaps even sooner.17 Similar conclusions 
can be derived by looking at percentage budget increases or the size of the scientific 
workforce. However, none of this tells you much about the quality of the system, its 
strengths, weaknesses and multiple trajectories. 
• China as a fast follower
This more nuanced position is well articulated by the US analysts Dan Breznitz and 
Michael Murphree, who argue that China doesn’t need to operate at the frontiers 
of global innovation in order to grow its position in innovation–based sectors and 
markets.18 Even as a ‘second–generation’ innovator, the sheer size and scale of China’s 
domestic market, and its low–cost manufacturing base, mean it is well positioned within 
increasingly interdependent global networks. Breznitz and Murphree set out to dispel 
two myths: first, that innovation should only be equated with the creation of entirely 
new technologies and markets; second, that China’s success should be benchmarked 
against ‘an idealized conception of Silicon Valley.’19 Indeed, they argue, China has been 
sustaining its long run of economic growth ‘by innovating in many stages of production, 
but not in novel product R&D’. They liken China to Lewis Carroll’s Red Queen, who 
had to run as fast as she could to stay in the same place: ‘China shines by keeping its 
industrial–production and service industries in perfect tandem with the technological 
frontier. Like the Red Queen, it runs as fast as possible in order to remain at the cusp 
of the global technological frontier without advancing the frontier itself.’20 A related 
point is made by Martin Wolf of the Financial Times, who argues that China is yet to 
produce globally significant ‘systems integrator’ companies, on which so much of global 
production and distribution now depends. “Moreover, such is the lead of the advanced 
countries’ incumbents that it is going to find it extremely hard to do so….The striking 
feature of (China’s) economy remains its dependence on the know how of others.”21 
• China as a giant with an Achilles’ heel
Despite the size of China’s economy and its investments in research and innovation, 
some argue that it has fundamental weaknesses that will prevent it from fulfilling 
its stated objectives. Will Hutton identifies the problem as the contradictions of an 
authoritarian state, the lack of transparent institutions and constraints on creativity 
within China’s education system.22 In a recent article, he concludes: “Innovation is 
driven by open interaction…and by the confidence that the law will back any intellectual 
property rights that you create and protect your profits. None of these preconditions 
apply in China…China is the classic bubble economy, its innovative capabilities fatally 
undermined by the one–party state.”23 A more nuanced version of this argument is 
made by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in their book Why Nations Fail, which 
analyses the governance and institutional underpinnings of economic success. In their 
discussion of China’s growth, Acemoglu and Robinson suggest that it “is just another 
form of growth under extractive political institutions…unlikely to translate into sustained 
economic development.”24 Others identify shorter–term, but no less fundamental 
problems, in China’s weak enforcement of IP protection, and in its sclerotic enterprise 
sector, which has little incentive to innovate.
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• China as a techno–nationalist
This more hawkish account argues that while there are some encouraging signs of 
reform and openness within the Chinese innovation system, there is also an ever present 
undercurrent of techno–nationalism. It identifies threats to the US and Europe from 
China’s ‘indigenous innovation’ strategy, which it sees as based on forced IP transfer, 
standards manipulation, discriminatory regulatory and tax policies, and preferential 
treatment towards state–owned enterprises. A report by the Washington–based think 
tank, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, provides a forceful 
statement of this position: “China seeks not merely competitive advantage, but absolute 
advantage. In other words, China’s strategy is to win in virtually all industries, especially 
advanced technology products and services.”25 It sees China’s 2006 MLP as the start of a 
‘shift to a ‘China Inc.’ development model focused on helping Chinese firms, often at the 
expense of foreign firms. This narrative plays into, and is reinforced by concerns about 
Chinese state–sponsored hacking and cybercrime, and the theft of industrial secrets, 
particularly in high–tech sectors. These concerns received prominent international 
coverage following a 2012 report by the information security firm Mandiant.26 Advocates 
of this view argue that R&D collaboration with China is often naïve and the US and 
Europe instead need to get tougher on Chinese IP infringement, and support China’s 
adherence to international systems of rules–based trade.27 
• China as a low–carbon pioneer 
This more optimistic account suggests that China is playing a longer–term, highly 
strategic game. Recognising the challenges of climate change, resource depletion, 
biodiversity and water stress, and the particularly acute pressures these will create for 
China, it is targeting investment in key areas of low–carbon and sustainable innovation, 
such as wind, solar and other renewable energy technologies, and frugal resource–
efficient manufacturing, that will enable it to lead globally in these sectors as they grow. 
Solar energy is perhaps the best example of an emerging sector where China has taken 
a strong global position,28 although the recent bankruptcy of the main subsidiary of 
Suntech Power, one of its leading solar panel manufacturers, has somewhat tarnished 
this.29 Nonetheless, there is considerable interest and speculation about whether China 
can direct its innovation efforts towards national and global challenges, for which its 
more directed model of policy and management is arguably well suited.30 The big 
question is whether it uses these strengths to advance collaborative, global solutions – 
particularly to collective problems such as climate change – or to advance its national 
self–interest. 
China as an ‘absorptive state’
As emphasised above, none of these narratives approaches a complete account of the 
current state or future prospects for science and innovation in China. But their complexity 
and contradictions are a useful starting point. In this report, we would like to introduce a 
sixth narrative – that of China as an ‘absorptive state’ – which captures well the dynamics 
and tensions now at play within the Chinese system.
The concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ is a familiar one in innovation debates, and was first 
introduced by Cohen and Levinthal in 1990 to describe an individual firm’s “ability to 
recognise the value of new information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends.”31 It 
refers both to absorption in the conventional sense, and to more specific abilities to exploit 
and create knowledge. Beyond its application to individual firms, absorptive capacity can 
also be analysed at the level of regional or national innovation systems, as “the ability 
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necessary for the host country to absorb and adopt new incoming technology from a 
foreign country.”32 A 2008 Nesta report on global innovation defines it as ‘the ability of one 
place to absorb and adopt knowledge coming from another place.’33 It goes on to explain: 
‘Some places are better able to absorb ideas, attract talent and create opportunities than 
others…These places are magnets for talent, investments and knowledge.’34 
Why is the notion of China as an absorptive state useful as a way of making sense of its 
growing strengths in innovation? We suggest three reasons.
First, because absorption is a key feature of China’s indigenous innovation policies. The 
2006 MLP describes one of its central objectives as strengthening indigenous innovation 
by “enhancing original innovation, integrated innovation, and re–innovation based on 
assimilation and absorption of imported technology.”35 
Second, it helps to explain what has changed in China’s innovation system over recent 
years. The MLP set out the direction of travel, but only after a sustained period of large–
scale targeted investment in basic research, universities and intermediary networks 
for translation and commercialisation, have the systemic conditions for research and 
innovation reached a point where the ideas can be effectively absorbed and exploited, with 
increasingly dense and targeted networks to enable this. This brings with it a sharper focus 
on those aspects of the system – such as state–owned enterprises – where progress is far 
slower and more uneven.
Third, it speaks directly to international concerns about how to strike the right balance 
between competition and collaboration with China through the innovation value chain. 
In 2006 and 2007, the precise meaning of words like ‘absorbing’ and ‘re–innovation’, and 
the mantra of ‘indigenous innovation’ (zizhu chuangxin), all of which were prominent in 
the MLP, were hotly debated by analysts in Europe and the US, where some saw them as 
implying an intention to steal technologies and IP from the west. Seven years on, there 
is a more measured understanding of the balance between China’s indigenous research 
capabilities (fostered through rapid and large–scale investment) and its relationship 
to ideas, technologies and firms elsewhere. Many tensions persist, but viewing China’s 
development in terms of enhanced absorptive capacity is a useful lens through which to 
understand how its innovation system has changed over the past decade, and where it 
is likely to go next. It builds on the notion of China as a ‘fast follower’, but goes further 
to explain how China adds value, creativity and novelty to innovation processes through 
absorption. 
Channels of absorption
In the chapters that follow, we use the notion of China’s absorptive state as a framework 
through which to analyse the strengths, weaknesses, trajectories and uncertainties of its 
innovation system. There are three main channels through which this process of absorption 
occurs: an improved structural environment for research and innovation; expanding 
domestic demand for innovation; and a growing density of international connections.
• Structural environment
Unprecedented growth in investment and research and patent output are features of 
an increasingly dynamic Chinese system. R&D spending has grown almost 20 per cent 
a year since the late 1990s, and will outpace that of the US within a decade, and the 
European Union even sooner. In 2011, Chinese residents overtook residents of the US 
to become the second largest group of patent applicants worldwide, and are likely to 
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have overtaken Japanese residents in 2012 to become number one.36 Yet innovation–
driven growth will only take place where the domestic system has the policy framework, 
the institutions and the capabilities to digest, absorb and embed new technology and 
knowledge. In this report, we explore two aspects of this shifting structural environment: 
the national policy framework; and how this translates into China’s diverse provincial and 
regional economies.
In Chapter Two (Indigenous innovation and the ‘Chinese dream’), we map significant 
developments in the policy and investment framework since 2006 and suggest likely 
directions and priorities for innovation policy under China’s new leadership. We look 
in detail at China’s funding inputs, S&T workforce and patent output, and explore the 
impact of a growing emphasis on quality, efficiency and evaluation.
In Chapter Three (Spotlight on Research), we move beyond the headlines, which show 
that China is now the second most prolific producer of research papers in the world, 
to take a deeper look at the data behind this dramatic increase in research output. 
Based on a detailed new quantitative analysis of the latest data on the output of China’s 
research system, we investigate the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese research, and 
what it means for the UK.
In Chapter Four (Many Chinas, many innovation systems), we outline the variation in 
these structural conditions, and in absorptive capacity, throughout the country. Across 
different Chinese provinces, cities and industrial sectors, there is widespread diversity 
in implementation and in the pace of change. While research and innovation activity are 
still highly concentrated on the China’s east coast, we highlight how, through a process 
of ‘structured uncertainty’, where different actors agree to disagree about the goals and 
methods of policy, unique models of innovation have developed in Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou. We describe how beyond these hotspots, regions tend to follow similar 
development models, and the concerns that a lack of regional coordination will limit 
future growth.
• Demand for innovation
While much of the focus of analysis of the Chinese system is on the increasing supply 
of resources from investment to talent, academics have paid less attention to the 
equally important demand for innovation within the system. In this report we focus 
on two elements of demand which are important to understanding the increasing 
‘absorptiveness’ of the Chinese system: the gradual shift towards an enterprise–led 
innovation system and the strengths of Chinese firms in ‘re–innovation’; and the 
mounting pressures for more sustainable economic growth that are driving an emphasis 
on environmental and social innovation.
In Chapter Five (The enterprise of innovation), we identify the new cadre of Chinese 
firms operating at the frontiers of global innovation, and consider how firms in general 
are responding to government pressure for more R&D–intensive indigenous innovation. 
In this chapter we explore new models of business innovation that are emerging in 
China. Previously regarded as a weakness, the quality and speed of China’s capacity 
for incremental re–innovation is now an important competitive asset. We explore how 
sophisticated manufacturing networks excel in absorbing, adapting, prototyping and 
market testing new products and technologies at speed and how ‘shanzhai’ methods 
of production, which previously referred only to substandard imitation, are of growing 
international interest as a distinctive way of adding value.
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In Chapter Six (Rebalancing growth), we explore how consumers, environmental 
concerns and civil society are becoming more important as drivers of innovation. More 
demanding Chinese consumers are pioneering new types of user–driven innovation, 
a process which will intensify as domestic consumption increases. Environmental 
and health concerns are prompting a sharper focus on low-carbon and sustainable 
innovation; and a more proactive and vocal civil society is at the forefront of growing 
calls for social innovation.
• International connectedness
The third aspect of the absorptive state is perhaps the most obvious: the growing 
density of China’s international connections. Absorption is enabled through increasing 
flows of people, ideas and technology and the integration of China within global 
research, innovation and production networks. We focus on two critical aspects of 
this connectedness: firstly the evolving patterns of China’s international research 
collaboration and how we should interpret the latest data to judge the UK’s relative 
position in these, and secondly the thorny issue of risk and national interest in 
international innovation collaboration. 
In Chapter Seven (Innovation diplomacy and collaboration), we use the latest data to 
review China’s global research partnerships and the current landscape for China–UK 
collaboration. We reveal that the UK has recently moved ahead of Japan to become the 
second most popular partner for Chinese researchers after the USA. For any country 
seeking to collaborate with China, ensuring a diversity of connections beyond research 
is crucial. In this chapter we benchmark the national strategies of several key countries 
towards collaboration with China in terms of strategic frameworks, trade and business 
links, student flows and influence on Chinese policy. We find that each country’s 
strengths and modes of engagement are unique and the transfer of ‘best practices’ in 
collaboration is rarely straightforward.
In Chapter Eight, (The real risk equation), we discuss the ‘dark side’ of absorption by 
looking at international flows of ideas and technology resulting from IP theft, forced 
technology transfer and cybercrime. Given that this is now a significant feature of the 
more hawkish perspectives on Chinese innovation, we explore how an increasingly 
absorptive Chinese system brings both risks and opportunities for businesses, 
universities and others seeking to work with and in China. We discuss how these risks 
need to be managed with care, and the need for smarter communication of the ‘risk 
equation’ from government to those who are thinking about engaging in innovation 
partnerships in China, but argue that they should not be over–emphasised such that 
they eclipse a far greater risk – that of failing to participate fully and benefit from the 
next phase of China’s growth.
In Chapter Nine (China–UK: Partners in the global innovation race), we conclude with a 
series of headline recommendations for ways in which UK–China collaboration can be 
strengthened: for example, through development of a stronger, multi–level innovation 
dialogue and targeted investment in collaborative R&D linked to Chinese and UK 
priorities (for example, the UK’s ‘eight great technologies’).
Innovation is caught up in a bigger unfolding debate about the pace, scale and direction 
of China’s economic and political reforms. Much still depends upon the playing out of 
a set of tensions: between the planned economy and the market; national and global 
priorities; the hardware of research infrastructure and the software of culture and ethics; 
the skills and creativity of home–grown talent, and the entrepreneurialism and networks 
of returnees. In the decades to come, China is likely to change innovation just as much 
as innovation changes China.
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2: INDIGENOUS INNOVATION  
 AND THE ‘CHINESE DREAM’
The Chinese dream is the great renaissance of the  
Chinese nation.” 
Xi Jinping, November 2012
On 29 November 2012, two weeks after he was confirmed as the head of the new Politburo 
Standing Committee, Xi Jinping led his committee colleagues on a tightly–choreographed 
day trip to the National Museum in Tiananmen Square. Upon arrival, China’s incoming 
leaders viewed an exhibition called Road to Rejuvenation, which depicts China’s journey 
from the hardships and humiliations of the 19th century to a restored greatness in the 21st 
century. In his informal remarks that day to a group of reporters and museum workers, 
Xi spoke of the ‘Chinese dream’, an idea that he returned to five months later in his 
inauguration speech as president. 
Given that Chinese leaders are not known for spontaneously introducing new political 
concepts, there is speculation as to why Xi has given the ‘Chinese dream’ such prominence. 
Some have suggested that he borrowed it from the columnist Tom Friedman; others that 
it is his restatement of longstanding notions of revival and renaissance.37 But the phrase 
has quickly taken off, with government campaigns launched to promote it in schools and 
the civil service, a dedicated website affiliated to the People’s Daily, and a TV talent show 
to find The Voice of the Chinese Dream. Academics are even being asked to come up with 
Chinese dream research proposals.38 
The dream is inspired by the so–called ‘two 100s’ that provide the context for China’s 
highest level goals: to become a ‘moderately well–off society’ by 2021, the 100th 
anniversary of the birth of the Chinese Communist Party; and to become a ‘rich, strong, 
democratic, civilised and harmonious socialist modern country’ by 2049, the 100th 
anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.39 Science and innovation are 
important elements of this journey of national renaissance, as reflected in China’s ambitions 
to become an ‘innovation oriented nation’ by 2020 and a ‘world science and technology 
power’ by around 2050,40 which are set out in the MLP. 
Yet a ‘dream’ seems the opposite of a plan – certainly the kind of long–range planning 
that defines the Chinese system to many Western observers. Dreams are often messy, 
uncoordinated and full of contradictions. Look beneath the surface of the Chinese 
innovation system though, and one finds more of these characteristics than one might 
expect.
In this chapter we look first at some of these contradictions, which are inherent in the 
Chinese approach. We then offer a snapshot of structural factors within the Chinese system 
and indicate where they are heading, based on the latest available data.
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The contradictions of an absorptive state
As the concept of indigenous innovation continues to develop, it’s clear that absorbing, 
attracting, improving and owning knowledge from elsewhere is a core strand of policy. 
According to official definitions of ‘indigenous innovation’, it is comprised of three 
concepts as set out in Table 1:
Table 1: Three concepts of indigenous innovation
Source: Medium and Long–term National Plan for Science and Technology Development 2006–2020 (MLP)41
The economist Mariana Mazzucato has written persuasively of the need for governments to 
recognise, value and exercise their agency as architects of an ‘entrepreneurial state’, able to 
direct policy and investment towards priority technologies and shape emerging markets.42 
Certain aspects of an ‘entrepreneurial state’ are already visible in China (for example in its 
strategic investment in renewable energy technologies) but there is still some distance to 
go before it reaches the kind of dynamic public–private innovation system that Mazzucato 
describes in places like Silicon Valley. For now, running through all of China’s national plans 
is an acute contradiction: “China’s national innovation system struggles to balance its need 
to utilize foreign sources of technology with a desire to nurture home–grown innovation.”43 
There is a considerable literature on the tensions between foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and indigenous innovation in China.44 On the one hand, the MLP says that China should: 
“Assimilate and absorb a series of advanced technologies, master a number of critical 
technologies concerning the nation’s strategic interests, and develop a range of major 
equipment and key products that possess proprietary intellectual property rights.”45 It 
also says that China should reduce its dependence on foreign technology to 30 per cent 
by 2020.46 The 12th Five Year Plan (FYP), launched in 2011, dropped this metric,47 instead 
stating that China “will actively expand imports of foreign technology”48 and “bring in 
senior talent and advanced technology from overseas and encourage foreign enterprises to 
set up R&D centres in China in order for China to learn advanced international management 
concepts and systems.”49 This perhaps reflects a growing recognition by Chinese 
policymakers of quite how dependent the drive for indigenous innovation is on inflows of 
foreign technologies and ideas. Table 2 identifies progress against targets in the MLP.
Chinese Pinyin Official translation
原始创新 Yuanshi Chuangxin Original innovation
集成创新 Jicheng Chuangxin Integrated innovation
引进消化吸收再创新 Yinjin Xiaohua Re–innovation based on assimilation and   
 Xishou Zai Chuangxin absorption of imported technology  
  (Literal translation: Introduce–digest–absorb  
  re–innovation)
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Table 2: Select MLP targets and progress50 
China’s reliance on foreign technology is illustrated by its high-tech exports, of which 79.9 
per cent were so called processing exports in 2010, where foreign technology is imported, 
assembled in China and then exported.55 
To drive China’s industries up the value chain, the 12th FYP identified ‘seven strategic 
emerging industries’ which are receiving preferential investment and policy support.56 
The plan states that R&D and indigenous innovation must be a ‘core feature’ of these new 
industries,57 which are intended to grow at 20 per cent per year, to account for 8 per cent 
of GDP in 2015, and around 15 per cent in 2020,58 up from 3 per cent in 2005.59 
The seven strategic industries are:
• Energy conservation and environmental protection.
• Next generation IT.
• Biotechnology.
• High–end equipment manufacturing.
• New energy.
• New materials.
• New energy vehicles.60 
 Target for 2020  Achievement 
 set in 2006 as of 2012
R&D expenditure as a share of GDP 2.5% 1.98%51 
The contribution of progress in science  
and technology to economic growth 60% 51%52
International ranking for patents granted Top 5 253  
to Chinese nationals
International ranking for number of citations of  Top 5 554 
scientific papers
Dependence on foreign technology 30% Metric dropped
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Table 3: Economic overview 
 
Coordination challenges
As R&D activities at mission–oriented agencies like agriculture and health increase, and 
as the Ministry of Finance and the National Development and Reform Commission take 
responsibility for areas of reform alongside the Ministry of Science and Technology, 
coordination issues are brought into sharp relief. While multiple sources of funding can be 
helpful, experts argue that a lack of overall coordination is creating serious inefficiencies in 
the system, such as an inability to deal with crises (e.g. the SARS outbreak in 2003), and 
the problem of well–established researchers getting identical projects funded by different 
agencies.63 These problems are compounded by deficiencies in national quality controls 
and evaluation and serious issues with misconduct and plagiarism in the research system.64
Table 4: Benchmarking China’s S&T performance
 China Brazil India UK US Germany Australia
Population (World 1,350,695,000 198,656,019 1,236,686,732 63,227,526 313,914,040 81,889,839 22,683,600  
Bank,61 2012) 
GDP (Current  8.227 2.252 1.841 2.435 15.684 3.399 1.520 
trillion US$, World  
Bank, 2012)
GNI per capita (PPP,  9,210 11,720 3,840 36,880 50,610 41,890 43,300 
current international  
US$, World Bank,  
2012)
GDP growth  7.8  0.9 3.2 0.3 2.2 0.7 3.4 
(Annual %, World  
Bank, 2012)
Literacy rate (Adult  94 (2010) 90 (2009) 63 (2006) 99 99 99 99 
total, %, World Bank)
Public spending on 4 (2012)62  5.8 3.3 5.6 (2009) 5.6 5.1 (2009) 5.1 (2009)  
education (% of GDP,  
World Bank, 2010)
 China Brazil India UK US Germany Australia
GERD (% of GDP,  1.84 1.1666 (2010) 0.7667 (2007) 1.76 2.77 2.88 2.2 (2010) 
OECD,65 2011)
Patent grants  112,347 380 776 4,938 108,626 21,789 1,267 
(to residents at  
domestic patent  
office, WIPO,68 2011)
National share of  12.73 2.75 3.67 7.6 28 7.47 3.4 
world publications  
(Thomson Reuters,  
2011)69
Researchers in 863 (2009) 704 (2010) 136 (2005) 3794 (2010) 4,673 (2007) 3979 (2010) 4294 (2008)  
R&D (per million  
population, World  
Bank)
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The next wave of reforms
While the MLP and earlier plans had a strong focus on technological achievements, recent 
plans emphasise the economic and social benefits of innovation.70 Notably, the 12th FYP 
called for innovation for public benefit and strengthening regional growth.71 There is also a 
sharper focus on value for money and return on the enormous investment that government 
is making in the research and innovation system. 
In July 2012, the Chinese Academy of Sciences hosted a conference to review progress 
since the launch of the MLP. A subsequent document titled: Opinions on Deepening 
the Reform of the Scientific and Technological System and Speeding up the Building of 
a National Innovation System identified priorities for further reform, including clearer 
definition of the mission of national R&D programmes; separation of entities for funding, 
research and performance evaluation; improving the sophistication of evaluation processes; 
and making reward systems more open and transparent.72 In addition, a formal mid–term 
review of the MLP is now underway and is expected to be completed in the second half of 
2014.
In this context, we will look in more detail at three dynamic areas of China’s national 
innovation system: funding; human capital inputs and patenting outputs followed in the 
next chapter by an in depth look at China’s research outputs.
Funding research and innovation
In 2012, China’s total expenditure on R&D exceeded one trillion RMB, or $163 billion, an 18 
per cent increase on the previous year. Gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a share of 
China’s GDP rose from 0.5 per cent in the mid–1990s to 1.84 per cent in 2011, and 1.97 per 
cent in 2012,73 a huge absolute spending rise in an economy that grew by a factor of ten 
over the same period. Figure 1 shows how this stacks up against leading spenders. Much of 
the growth has been driven by the business enterprise sector (BERD), the contribution of 
which increased from 60 per cent of GERD in 2000 to over 75 per cent in 2011.74 
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Figure 1: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D by top six countries, 201175 
Applied research and development account for the lion’s share of China’s spend.76 Even 
recent statistics show basic research accounting for less than 5 per cent of total R&D 
expenditure,77 which some argue inhibits the potential for breakthrough discoveries.78 
The National Natural Science Foundation (NSFC) mainly supports basic science research, 
through competitive and peer reviewed applications.79 Its expenditure on research of 14.6 
billion RMB (US$2.38 billion) in 2011 accounted for around 7.7 per cent of R&D expenditure 
by the Chinese government.80 
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Figure 2: Breakdown of R&D expenditure by type of activity, 201181
Government funding of science and technology programs is split across three main 
agencies: the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the National Natural Science Federation 
of China (NSFC) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST).82 The precise division 
of financing for applied R&D is more difficult to determine. China’s financial system is 
dominated by state–owned banks which provide loans at preferential rates to state–owned 
enterprises (SOEs), with smaller companies suffering severe credit shortages for business 
R&D.83 Chapter Five of this report reviews business R&D financing initiatives in more detail. 
Measuring China’s ‘hidden innovation’ 
While measuring R&D expenditure gives us an important indication of progress in 
innovation, it provides only a partial picture of innovative performance. In the UK, Nesta’s 
work has been influential in bringing to policymakers’ attention the fact that, in addition to 
investment in research and development, economic success depends on the downstream 
co–investments needed to commercialise and profit from new ideas: factors such as design, 
organisational improvements, training, software development and brand equity.84 These 
important elements are hidden from traditional statistical measures. For instance, the 
latest research for the UK shows that investment in R&D represents only 13 per cent of all 
investments in intangible assets.85 
To
ta
l
Re
se
ar
ch
 
   
in
st
itu
te
s
Hi
gh
er
  e
du
ca
tio
n
Bu
sin
es
s
50
90
80
40
30
70
60
10
20
0
Basic research Applied research Experimental development
2.9
97 54.1
32.9
55.8
31.9
12.3
83.5
11.8
4.7
%
26  CHINA’S ABSORPTIVE STATE: RESEARCH, INNOVATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHINA–UK COLLABORATION
 INDIGENOUS INNOVATION AND THE ‘CHINESE DREAM’
It is clear that investment in intangibles is more abundant in developed economies and 
there has been little published work to date that aims to measure intangible investments 
within the Chinese economy. Recent work by Hulten and Hao is an exception, and appears 
to indicate that, alongside the huge tangible investments China has made, intangible 
capital is becoming an important source of growth for firms, albeit in inefficient ways.86 
Intangible investments in innovation, across sectors from manufacturing to services and 
creative industries, will be essential to China’s future absorptive capacity and innovative 
performance. This is one measure that the world should watch with interest. 
China’s scientific and engineering workforce
An educated and skilled workforce is a crucial aspect of any national innovation system. 
In 2010, China launched its first comprehensive plan on human resources, the National 
Medium and Long–term Talent Development Plan (2010–2020),87 which sets a target of 180 
million ‘highly skilled workers’ by 2020, up from 114 million in 2010.88 This huge expansion 
will flow from sustained investments in education, which increased at an average of 21.58 
per cent per year between 2007 and 2012.89 
In 1998, 830,000 students graduated with a higher education qualification in China. By 
2012, graduate numbers hit 6.2 million,90 and by 2020, they are predicted to reach 10.5 
million. This would account for almost a third of the world’s total, and more than the USA 
and EU combined.91 In 2011, 41.61 per cent of Chinese students graduated with a degree 
in science or engineering (compared to 23 per cent in the UK and 15 per cent in the US in 
2010).92 These graduates contribute to China’s vast R&D workforce which in 2011 accounted 
for 25 per cent of the world’s total.93
But the quality of China’s graduates has not kept up with these huge leaps in quantity. A 
report by the consultancy McKinsey found that only 10 per cent of Chinese engineering 
graduates meet global employability standards.94 Many argue that the root of China’s 
low–quality graduates is an education system that does not encourage creativity.95 China 
2030, a report coauthored by the World Bank and the Development Research Centre of 
China’s State Council, says: “Perhaps the greatest challenge is how to encourage creativity 
and initiative, attributes that are urgently needed as the country strives for technological 
maturity.”96 
China’s S&T workforce is also uniquely afflicted by the disruption that the Cultural 
Revolution caused to the education system between 1966 and 1976. Denis Simon and Cong 
Cao argue that this has led to a missing generation of qualified S&T personnel in their 
50s to 60s. As a result, the leaders of China’s S&T workforce tend to be younger and less 
experienced than their counterparts in the west.97 
Attracting talent back to China
Chinese students who study abroad and return to China play a key role in China’s 
innovation system. Yet as the number of overseas students continues to increase rapidly 
and the quality of China’s own universities steadily improves, a foreign degree no longer 
carries the premium it once used to. Graduates who come back to China with work 
experience on the other hand are more valuable than ever. These returnees act as an 
important conduit for the skills, contacts, management abilities and technologies that 
China’s drive to become a more innovative nation requires. 
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In 2011, a total of 339,000 Chinese students went abroad to study,98 the largest national 
cohort of overseas students globally. Simon and Cao note that data on returnee students is 
notoriously difficult to collect,99 but the best estimates from the Ministry of Education show 
that over 810,000 Chinese students have returned to live and work in China since 1978.100 
The Chinese research system has strong ties to the west. Figures from Yu Wei, deputy 
director of the office of scientific research at Peking University show that 47 per cent 
of the lead scientists on MoST’s major research programmes between 2006 and 2011 
received their PhDs from a foreign institution.101 Returnees also play an important role in 
the administration of China’s S&T system: both China’s Minister of Science and Technology, 
Wan Gang, and Yang Wei, the head of the National Natural Science Foundation of China 
(NSFC) received their PhDs abroad, and the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
Bai Chunli, also did post–doctoral training abroad.
However, with the quality of China’s top universities steadily increasing, a degree from a 
foreign university is no longer a guarantee of a good job. Where returnees are still highly 
valued is in the experience they have gained from working or carrying out research abroad. 
This will be an important trend to watch for countries like the UK, the US and Australia 
which currently receive large cohorts of international students from China.
Research by Wang and Zweig shows how returnees who have worked abroad have played 
‘a leading role in many aspects of China’s ‘going out’ strategy.’102 Crucial to this are the 
contacts that they bring with them, their access to foreign investors and their knowledge of 
foreign research cultures.103 As Chinese companies seek to expand their global operations, 
the value of such experience will continue to grow.
Management skills are another area where returnees are highly valued. Multinationals 
in China face a chronic shortage of management skills104 and whereas they previously 
filled this gap with expatriate managers, they now increasingly look to returnees.105 
One recent study confirmed the value a returnee can bring to a company, finding that 
companies which have board members with overseas management experience had greater 
profitability and productivity.106 
Recognising the benefits that returnees bring to the Chinese economy, the government 
has put a lot of effort into attracting Chinese graduates back to China through targeted 
schemes. The Thousand Talents Program (2008) and the Thousand Youth Talents Program 
(2011) had sponsored 2,263 academics by the end of 2012.107 However, these schemes 
have also been criticised both for failing to attract the best academics back to China and 
failing to persuade them to relocate in China permanently.108 On the business side, several 
provinces across China have built ‘Pioneer Parks’ to attract returnee entrepreneurs with 
generous subsidies. 
China’s patenting surge
In 2011, China’s patent office, SIPO, overtook that of the USA to receive more patent 
applications than any other country in the world.109 Between 2009 and 2011, patent filings 
worldwide increased by 293,900, with the Chinese patent office SIPO accounting for 72 
per cent of this growth.110 This is a remarkable rise from a country whose patent law only 
came into effect in 1985. Growth has been driven overwhelmingly by domestic applicants, 
who filed 82 per cent of patent applications in 2012.111 While this patent explosion has been 
broadly welcomed by Chinese policymakers, others have queried the extent to which it 
represents genuine innovation.112
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Figure 3: Trend in patent applications for the top five offices (reproduced from WIPO 2012)113
China’s patent system grants three types of patents: invention patents, utility models 
and industrial designs.114 Invention patents, which are most similar to patents in the UK, 
accounted for just over a quarter of China’s 1.9 million domestic patent applications in 
2012. Utility models, which are granted for incremental technological improvements, and 
industrial designs, which are granted for the external appearance of a product do not 
undergo a substantive examination.115 Richard Suttmeier, a US analyst of China’s innovation 
policies, expresses concern about China’s explosion in utility patents: “It is not entirely 
clear whether this phenomenon serves the development of genuine innovative capacity in 
China.”116 In a report for the US Chamber of Commerce, patent lawyer Thomas Moga argues 
that the utility model system has created “patent weapons that are disruptive to normal 
business growth.”117 This disruption occurs when so called non–practicing entities, or ‘patent 
trolls’ buy up cheap patents solely for use in malicious patent litigation.
Others suggest that the utility model system suits China’s current stage of development. 
Because they are typically granted in under a year, they are ‘most appropriate for products 
with lower levels of inventiveness and/or short lifecycles (which require they enter the 
market quickly).’118 
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Table 5: Chinese patent applications by type, 2012
Source: SIPO, 2012.119 
Government policy has been one of the primary drivers of this boom in patents.120 China’s 
National Patent Development Strategy (2011–2020) set a target of two million annual 
patent applications by 2015 (up from around 1.2 million in 2010), a goal it reached three 
years early in 2012.121 Local governments also set their own targets: the EU Chamber of 
Commerce in China found 150 patent targets in policy documents at the provincial and 
municipal level.122 
The National Patent Development Strategy also sets a target to double the number of 
patent applications filed by Chinese applicants abroad.123 Although less dramatic than 
domestic patenting, China’s international patent applications are also increasing rapidly. 
For example, Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications rose from 5,455 in 2007 to 
18,614 in 2012.124 
To support these targets, central and local governments offer a range of subsidies 
and incentives. Research by Li Xibao at Tsinghua University shows that subsidies were 
the primary driver of patent growth between 2000 and 2007.125 In many cases, local 
governments directly pay patent application and examination fees.126 Incentives include 
a reduced corporate tax rate of 15 per cent (down from 25 per cent), to firms that qualify 
as High and New Technology Enterprises (HNTE), with number of patents filed one of the 
core qualification criteria.127 Patent application targets are also an element of performance 
measurement for managers of central SOEs.128 
While China is the world’s number one in terms of number of domestic patent applications, 
in 2011 it had fewer than 700,000 patents in force, compared to over 2.1 million in the US.129 
Data from SIPO shows that the average lifespan of an invention patent filed by a domestic 
applicant was 6.9 years in 2011, compared to 10.3 years for foreign applicants and over half 
had a lifespan of less than five years, compared to 15.2 per cent for foreign patents.130 A 
2005 survey of academics in the nanotechnology sector in China found that almost half 
had no interest in licencing or utilising their patents, which they had filed purely for career 
advancement.131 
Sectorial strengths
A small number of studies have sought to use the pattern of China’s patent applications 
to evaluate and predict shifting sectorial strengths in innovation. However, the evidence is 
inconclusive. A Thomson Reuters analysis of patents published between 2005 and 2010 
found the main growth areas were electrical machinery apparatus and energy, digital 
communication and computer technology. The report predicts continued growth in these 
areas, alongside the seven strategic emerging industries identified in the 12th FYP.132 A 
different Thomson Reuters report compared the fields in which China is patenting to the 
global average for each field, and found that ‘China shows no particular dominance in any 
one technology field, indicating that innovation is broadly balanced across the spectrum.’133 
 Total Invention Utility Model Industrial Design
Domestic 1,912,151 535,313 734,437 642,401
Non–resident 138,498 117,464 5,853 15,181
Total 2,050,649 652,777 740,290 657,582
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Recent analysis of US Patent Office data reminds us that patenting data presents a 
skewed picture of sectorial strength. It found that ‘a tiny number of Chinese companies, 
concentrated in the ICT equipment industry, accounts for the largest share of the dramatic 
increase in USPTO patents held by Chinese residents.’134 
Patented futures
The significant proportion of low–quality patents has been recognised by the Chinese 
government, which is now setting out to change incentive structures. In 2013, the 
government issued a fresh implementation plan for its National Intellectual Property 
Strategy, aimed at encouraging IP creators ‘to transfer their focus from quantity to 
quality.’135 This follows a 2012 statement from the Ministry of Science and Technology 
which indicated that career advancement of government staff would be decoupled from 
the number of patents filed and connected instead to a broader index of research and 
innovation performance.136 National news outlets have reported Tian Lipu, the head of 
China’s State Intellectual Property Office, as saying that incentives should be overhauled 
to focus on international and invention patents, rather than utility models and industrial 
designs.137 
Though there are many problems associated with the huge investments China has made 
in driving the output of its patent system, Professor Mu Rongping of CAS IPM argues that 
it shouldn’t be viewed as a failure. Indeed, he believes “resources spent on the patent 
system have been like a tuition fee, teaching scientists how to file patents and why they are 
important. This has been a learning process, but in the next two years the government is 
likely to stop its support and let people file patents on their own.”138 
Where next for China’s indigenous innovation policies?
A policy focus since the early 1990s on investment and growth has propelled China into 
the top ranks of global R&D investment, and publication and patenting output. China 
looks on track to realise its dream of becoming an ‘innovation oriented nation’ by 2020, 
an achievement which is due in no small part to its deep connections to global sources of 
technology and expertise and its growing ability to absorb and exploit them. But a deeper 
look at the available data shows that the process of becoming a more innovative nation has 
been highly inefficient. Government policies are now being complemented by a growing 
focus on efficiency, quality, coordination and evaluation. 
In the next chapter we take a deeper look at the data behind China’s dramatic increase in 
research output and investigate the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese research. 
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3: SPOTLIGHT ON RESEARCH
The headline statistics on the growth of the Chinese research base are staggering.139 Over 
the last 30 years, research output has grown from around 2,000 to over 150,000 journal 
articles and reviews per year.140 This represents the most rapid expansion of a national 
research system ever seen. For this report we undertook detailed new quantitative analysis 
of the latest data on the output of China’s research system. The unprecedented growth 
and dynamism we found at a subject and institutional level means that, unlike established 
research economies such as the USA and UK, which are relatively stable from year to year, 
the strengths, weaknesses and opportunities of China’s research base are very difficult to 
assess and predict. For this reason we reach beyond the averages to shine a spotlight on 
the Chinese research trajectory. Further detail is available in the online bibliometric annex 
to this report. 
Figure 4.  National share of world publications indexed on Thomson Reuters’ Web of   
 Science, 2002–2011. Data shown for G7 and BRICK nations (Brazil, Russia,India,  
 China, South Korea), which collectively authored 8 million of 10.9 million papers  
 indexed globally in the decade141
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Relative to other countries, China increased its share of world output from about 5 per 
cent in 2002 to around 13 per cent in 2011 (Figure 4). During the same period, the US 
share fell from 33 per cent to 28 per cent and although UK output rose in absolute terms 
its global share fell from 9 per cent to 7.5 per cent (Figure 5). Unlike G7 countries, where 
international collaboration accounts for the lion’s share of growth over the last 25 years, the 
growth of China’s research output is driven primarily by increased domestic activity. 
Figure 5.  Absolute and relative numbers of publications indexed on Thomson Reuters’  
 Web of Science for the UK and China, 2002–2011142
 
In 2013 MoST released the Guidelines for the 2014 National S&T fund on publishing of S&T 
works.143 As well as a focus on the seven strategic emerging industries and basic research, 
the strategy also showed the government’s ambition for Chinese research to make more of 
an impact on the world stage, with outstanding academic papers written in English as one 
of the key areas it would fund. 
A high–level overview of the quality and quantity of research papers is useful but hides 
important details, even when viewed by major scientific field. Beneath these headline 
numbers, we need to consider the spread of growth in research activity across subject 
areas, and how this compares with the portfolio of a country like the UK.
It is important to understand the breakdown of activity within the Chinese system. The 
balance of China’s research portfolio is strongly tilted towards physical sciences and 
engineering. This contrasts to that of the UK, which is balanced towards life sciences. Rapid 
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growth is pervasive throughout the system. It is notable in large fields such as engineering, 
as well as fields that are newer to Chinese researchers, such as molecular biology. There 
are also a few fields showing exceptional growth in recent years – for instance, biomaterials 
grew 15–fold in the last decade.
The fields that have grown most rapidly are those that were a formerly a relatively small 
part of total output. Other large research fields, for example Physics, Materials Science and 
Chemistry have grown more slowly than the national average. China’s research has tended 
to be strongest in areas associated with manufacturing industries: for example, it currently 
has a 20 per cent world share of chemistry publications, up from 10 per cent in 2002 (this 
is an area that has become a smaller part of the UK portfolio over the last 30 years). By 
contrast, growth in the biomedical sciences is accelerating much more rapidly. For example, 
China’s global share of Molecular Biology and Genetics was around 1 per cent in 2000 and 
is now over 10 per cent, which is an increase from 1.8 per cent to 2.7 per cent of China’s 
total output. See the online report annex for far greater detail.
The finer grained journal categories in Thomson Reuters’ data are the 256 categories used 
in the Web of Science. Some 80 of these have a growth rate that is greater than the China 
research base average (around four–fold) but in many cases that difference is not very 
great (>4 but <5). Table 6 shows outlier growth in output.
Table 6. Select outlier examples of high growth rates for China’s research analysed at the  
 level of Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science journal categories144 
Other categories in the molecular/biomedical area that grew faster than the national 
average, if less spectacularly than those in Table 5, and now have a large annual volume in 
excess of 1,000 papers per year are Pharmacology and Pharmacy (2,600 annual papers), 
Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (2,500), Oncology (2,130), Neurosciences (1,900), 
and Research and Experimental Medicine (1,570). On the other hand Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology (2,500 papers) grew more slowly than the average.
Telecommunications (1,580 papers per year), Water Resources (1,080), Energy and Fuels 
(980), Electrochemistry (870), and Materials Science – Coatings and Films (820) were 
among the categories on the technology side that grew faster than average. Although 
growing more slowly than the average, Optics (4,685) and Applied Physics (in excess of 
6,000) are large research fields for China and grew more than three–fold.
 Growth factor  Recent annual 
 in decade total
Food Science and Technology 8–fold 1,500 papers
Medicinal Chemistry 12–fold 1,000 papers
Integrative and Complementary Medicine 15–fold 550 papers
Orthopaedics Over 7–fold 425 papers
Mathematical and Computational Biology 8–fold 300 papers
Materials Science – Biomaterials 15–fold 160 papers
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (core journals) 7–fold 115 papers
Physical Geography 11–fold 110 papers
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Some ESI fields showed a very mixed pattern at the finer Web of Science level. For 
example, Materials Science – Composites (270 papers per year) contracted, unlike other 
areas of Materials. Similarly, Computer Science – Theory and Methods (580 papers per 
year) contracted rapidly and Computer Science – Artificial Intelligence (over 1,000) hardly 
grew at all.
This evidence highlights the need for analysts to be cautious in interpretation of general 
bibliometric indicators of China’s research performance without more detailed examination. 
Some large fields have grown by an absolutely large amount, far beyond the capacity of 
most G7 nations; others have grown more slowly than the China average. Some fields have 
niche peaks and troughs of growth only evident under close scrutiny.
Another important question is whether this growth in output has come at the expense of 
quality? Judging the quality of research is difficult. The value of research publications is 
reflected in their subsequent impacts, which may be academic, economic and social. As 
social and economic factors are hard to quantify, we use citations – the number of times a 
work is subsequently referenced by later publications as an indicator of academic impact.145 
Figure 6.  Normalised citation impact (world average = 1.0) of research papers published  
 by G7 and emerging countries, 2002–2011146
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While China’s normalised citation impact is still below world average in most areas, the 
data in Table 7 shows that it is close to that benchmark in a number of fields, including 
engineering and mathematics, and consistently above average in agriculture. Overall 
citation impact may in fact be improving more rapidly than indicated in previous analyses 
as a result of China’s unique growth rate. (See online bibliometric annex for further 
analysis.)
There is no general relationship between the size or growth rate of any field and its average 
normalised citation impact. Table 7 shows shifts in the impact of key fields in the last five 
years. 
Table 7. Normalised citation impact by ESI field for China papers from 2003–2011147
The table is ranked by average impact for the last five years (2007–2011). ‘Gain’ is calculated as the ratio between 
the average impact for the last three years and the first three years. 
 Publications ’03–‘12 Normalised citation impact
     Gain  
     ‘03–05 
 Count Growth 03–’11  07–‘11  vs 
     ‘09–‘11
Microbiology 10,569 7.96 0.73 0.72 0.77
Neuroscience and behaviour 15,903 6.46 0.75 0.75 0.94
Immunology 7,404 9.37 0.75 0.76 1.03
Space science 7,252 2.53 0.76 0.79 1.37
Biology and biochemistry 42,473 4.61 0.79 0.81 1.23
Pharmacology and toxicology 23,408 6.49 0.81 0.82 1.03
Molecular biology and genetics 20,648 8.48 0.82 0.83 0.92
Clinical medicine 93,303 6.17 0.84 0.84 0.95
Plant and animal science 34,967 5.07 0.82 0.84 1.07
Materials science 114,482 3.51 0.84 0.86 1.16
Chemistry 227,049 2.90 0.85 0.87 1.15
CHINA total 1,073,032 3.86 0.85 0.88 1.10
Physics 151,859 3.10 0.88 0.89 1.06
Environment/ecology 26,350 5.16 0.87 0.89 1.07
Psychiatry/psychology 4,820 4.32 0.90 0.92 0.92
Social sciences 13,424 5.20 0.93 0.94 0.95
Economics and business 6,809 5.95 0.95 0.95 0.96
Geosciences 31,551 4.10 0.98 0.96 0.91
Engineering 119,006 4.57 0.97 1.00 1.08
Mathematics 41,701 3.51 1.03 1.01 0.88
Agricultural sciences 19,087 7.91 1.02 1.03 0.94
Computer science 35,760 4.02 0.87 1.07 1.67
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The impact of some rapidly growing areas of biomedical and molecular sciences are 
grouped around, or slightly below, China’s average citation impact. These are areas where 
China is likely to benefit most from international collaboration, and where the UK research 
base is particularly strong. However, the value of interpreting the strength of broad areas 
of Chinese research in these terms is limited, as we noted earlier. It would be more valuable 
to drill down to the detailed view offered by the Web of Science fields and essential to 
consider institutional patterns in order to identify leading research groups. Table 8 provides 
some examples of particularly strong niche fields within the broader areas of science.
The strengths and weaknesses of China’s research portfolio
We should be very cautious when interpreting strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese 
system with too broad a brush. Spikes of excellence (see p.38) and pools of mediocrity 
can be hidden among the averages. Analysis across the 256 finer grained Web of Science 
(WoS) journal categories needs to take careful account of varying field size, as well as the 
average citation impact and any trends (of output or impact) within each field. Because of 
the exceptional dynamics of the China research economy, a conventional SWOT analysis 
is almost meaningless. Using historical data to safely predict future strategic positions 
requires a steady state. For Chinese research, there are currently too many dynamic 
variables to allow for accurate predictions.
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Table 8.  Examples of China’s research strengths within major areas of the research base  
 (2003–2012)148 
Subjects starred and highlighted in bold are China’s top 10 (ranked by impact) of all Web of Science categories 
where volume exceeds 1,000 papers in the period.
Essential Science  
Indicators journal ESI Web of Science journal category WoS  Papers 
category impact  impact
    Total  Growth
  *Horticulture 1.35 2,081 3.5
  *Agricultural Engineering 1.32 1,924 15.2
Agricultural Sciences 1.03 Agriculture, Multidisciplinary 1.29 3,260 10.4
  Agronomy 1.20 4,517 3.2
  Food Science and Technology 1.12 8,372 8.9
  *Electrochemistry 1.33 12,503 6.0
Chemistry 0.87 Organic Chemistry 1.17 20,615 2.6
  Analytical Chemistry 1.07 25,698 2.5
  *Cybernetics 2.00 1,054 1.7
  *Theory and Methods 1.44 13,004 0.7
Computer Science 1.07 *Hardware and Architecture 1.40 3,300 2.3
  *Artificial Intelligence 1.38 11,005 3.6
  Telecommunications 1.25 8,146 5.2
  *Instruments and Instrumentation 1.36 8,607 4.1
  *Transportation Sci and *Technology 1.35 1,514 3.8
  *Civil Engineering 1.33 9,039 3.8
Engineering 1.00 Biomedical Engineering 1.31 4,948 4.5
  Automation and Control Systems 1.22 8,275 4.5
  Industrial Engineering 1.19 3,155 1.6
  Nuclear Science and Technology 1.14 3,995 2.3
  Environmental Engineering 1.13 8,837 6.9
  Textiles 1.26 1,685 3.4
  Paper and Wood 1.22 590 6.2
Materials Science 0.86 Characterisation and Testing 1.20 2,181 2.1
  Biomaterials 1.09 4,473 4.6
  Nanoscience and Nanotechnology 1.06 22,186 6.9
  Composites 1.06 4,784 1.1
Mathematics 1.01 Mathematics 1.14 22,671 2.4
  Applied Mathematics 1.07 33,539 2.7
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China’s papers in 54 WoS fields have, across the decade, more than 1,000 papers and an 
average citation impact above the world average. A further 17 fields have smaller volume 
but also have an average normalised citation impact greater than world average. There are 
other fields that have surprisingly low citation impact.
In analysing publication volume and growth at this granularity, we again find a complex 
mosaic. Mathematics is high impact overall but some specialist areas (Mathematical 
Psychology, Mathematical and Computational Biology) appear weaker. Similarly, in 
Materials Science, both Composites and Ceramics are below world average but Textiles is 
well above (1.24).
EXAMPLES OF CHINESE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 
EXCELLENCE
• In June 2013, China took the number one spot in the TOP500, a twice–yearly ranking 
of the world’s fastest supercomputers when the Tianhe–2 (or Milky Way–2) was 
successfully tested almost two years ahead of schedule.149 
• In April 2013, material scientists at Zhejiang University announced the world’s lightest 
material: a graphene aerogel that is 12 per cent lighter than the previous record 
holder.150 
• China’s manned submersible, the Jiaolong, set a new national dive record after 
reaching more than 7,000 meters below sea level in June 2012.
• BGI (formerly Beijing Genomics Institute, a spin out of the CAS Beijing Institute 
of Genomics) has gone from accounting for around 1 per cent of the world’s gene 
sequencing capabilities in 1999 to almost 50 per cent today. BGI works with more than 
10,000 collaborators from universities and industry around the world.151 
• Beidou Satellite Navigation System (equivalent to the American GPS system) is now in 
service and aims to provide a global service by 2020.
• In October 2012, China unveiled Asia’s largest mobile radio telescope in Shanghai to 
collect data from satellites and probes.152 
• The Harbin–Dalian high speed railway, the first in the world capable of operating in 
areas of extremely low temperatures, began operations in December 2012. 
Bibliometric data can be useful in devising strategies for international collaboration, but 
it is important to dig beneath the level of disciplines to understand the performance 
of individual institutions and research groups. At its best, the Chinese system has 
concentrations of output and excellence similar to those of a G7 nation. Fewer than 10 per 
cent of Chinese institutions collectively produce more than 50 per cent of papers (a similar 
picture to that of the UK). Overall in China, 100 institutions account for about 90 per cent 
of research activity, as reflected in publications. While China’s largest and best–funded 
universities look increasingly like big civic universities in the UK in terms of their output 
profile, there are also niche pockets of excellence in medium size and smaller institutions. 
In the next chapter, we consider the distribution of research excellence in the context of 
China’s fast–changing geography of innovation.
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4: MANY CHINAS,  
 MANY INNOVATION SYSTEMS
Over a thousand miles from the coast, Chengdu is a city of 14 million people with an 
ambition to become a global IT powerhouse. If you’re reading this on an iPad, there’s 
a good chance it was made in Foxconn’s Chengdu factory.153 The city is also becoming 
known for its software companies, with three of the ten most popular Chinese apps in 2012 
developed by Chengdu–based companies.154 
Chengdu’s transformation from a regional backwater to a global economic powerhouse is 
startling: from $44.85 billion in 2006, its GDP hit $132 billion in 2012, larger than the whole 
of Hungary.155 It has managed this transformation by attracting many of the world’s top 
high–tech companies to set up in the city, including Dell, GE and Siemens.156
Second tier cities like Chengdu, Xi’an and Wuhan, have all benefited from a boom in 
infrastructure building as a result of government policies to develop central and western 
China, which has in turn led to investment flowing in from multinationals looking to take 
advantage of low wages and access rapidly expanding local markets.157 As a consequence, 
these cities are increasingly moving up the innovation value chain. This suggests that the 
future geography of innovation in China will shift beyond the coastal regions.
For now, however, the bulk of innovation remains highly concentrated on the east coast. 
Just three east coast cities – Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen – accounted for over 31 per 
cent of all invention patent grants in 2012,158 and the share of patents granted to applicants 
in the eastern region has grown over time, from 50 per cent in 2001 to 67.2 per cent in 
2011.159 East coast cities also produced over half of all papers published in Web of Science 
referenced journals in 2011 (with Beijing alone responsible for 25 per cent). The east coast 
region also received 64 per cent of all funding from central government S&T plans in 2011.160 
This concentration of innovation inputs and outputs mirrors China’s economic geography, 
which is characterised by a developed east coast and poorer inland regions. When Deng 
Xiaoping announced in 1985 that it was OK for some regions to get rich first, the coastal 
provinces took advantage of their natural advantages to leap ahead of the rest of the 
country. Now the same model is being applied to innovation, with the government calling 
for ‘innovation resource–intensive regions to take the lead in achieving innovation–
driven development.’161 Coastal provinces have used their many innovation resources, 
including highly educated workers, clusters of universities and research institutes and low 
transportation costs to actively promote their regions, which has ensured that innovation 
inputs and outputs are highly concentrated in the east.162
Western regions on the other hand have a weaker environment for innovation, including 
lower levels of education. As a result, they face difficulties in winning government S&T 
projects on merit and also tend only to attract FDI for low–cost manufacturing, rather than 
R&D, which doesn’t help them to become more innovative.163 China’s regional disparities 
are being exacerbated by the government’s drive to place businesses at the centre of 
the innovation system,164 as regional differences in R&D expenditure are greater between 
companies than between government agencies.165 Furthermore, R&D intensive industries 
which were once compelled to locate in western China because of the military-industrial 
‘third line’ construction project are now leaving these regions for more favourable 
conditions in the developed east.166 
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Figure 7:  Inputs to Chinese innovation: A geographic view
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Regional models of innovation
China’s national S&T plans do not set out detailed policies for different regions.177 Instead, 
central government calls on regions to rely on their own ‘distinctive innovation resources’ 
and draw on regional characteristics to develop their innovative capacity.178 Provinces 
also have a lot of spending power, with half of China’s total S&T expenditure coming from 
provincial and local governments.179 
This autonomy has resulted in experimentation with different models of S&T development. 
Innovation scholars Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree describe this as “structured 
uncertainty”, which they define as “an agreement to disagree about the goals and methods 
of policy.” They argue that the ambiguity of much of Chinese policy “leads to multiple 
interpretations and implementations of the same policy.”180 
However, structured uncertainty has also lead to short–termism in the goals that businesses 
and policymakers pursue, as the vagueness of Chinese policy means that “it is impossible 
under the force of structured uncertainty for any actor—political or business—to know ex 
ante what behaviors…will be encouraged or sanctioned.”181 While these conditions have 
created unique models of innovation in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, discussed below, 
beyond these hotspots they have also led to the contradictory phenomenon whereby 
different Chinese regions have a tendency to follow the same development models, 
despite their unique endowments.182 The World Bank believes this stems from the lack of 
a nationally coordinated innovation policy, which could ultimately hinder China’s future 
economic development.183 
Beijing 
When Microsoft decided to set up an R&D centre in China, Beijing was the obvious choice 
of location. China’s capital is home to 83 universities and colleges,184 including China’s two 
most prestigious universities, Tsinghua and Peking, and 41 of the 104 research labs of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences.185 Furthermore, 25 per cent of all papers published in WoS 
referenced journals come from Beijing.186 
Beijing also invests more in R&D as a per centage of output than any other Chinese region, 
at 5.7 per cent, and in 2011 spent 93.66 billion RMB (US$15.3 billion) on R&D, over a third 
of the UK’s total R&D spend.187 As a result of the abundance of research institutes and 
universities in Beijing, over 50 per cent of R&D expenditure comes from the government,188 
which is significantly higher than other east coast regions. The large number of universities 
and research institutes also means that the reason why R&D spending is more focused on 
basic and applied research than other parts of the country.
Beijing’s impressive educational and research resources are largely located in the north 
west of the city, in and around Zhongguancun Science Park. This cluster has spawned 
a vibrant industry of university spin outs, such as Lenovo and Founder group, private 
companies such as Baidu, venture capital firms and incubators such as Zhenfund and 
Innovation Works and has attracted many multinationals to set up R&D centres there, such 
as Intel and IBM. These R&D resources mean that Beijing is granted over twice the number 
of invention patents per capita than Shanghai. 
Shanghai
Five hours down the coast by high–speed train, Shanghai has used its openness to 
multinationals and the strong support of state–owned companies to develop China’s most 
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advanced integrated circuit cluster.189 Shanghai’s Zhangjiang hi–tech park is home to many 
of the world’s most famous names in semiconductors, such as Nvidia and Intel, and China’s 
largest state owned semiconductor foundries. As a result, the park accounted for 20 per 
cent of China’s integrated circuit sales in 2010.190 
While Beijing has a comparative focus on fundamental research, Shanghai has carved 
out a niche for itself in development–focused R&D to support its strong manufacturing 
base.191 Yet the integrated circuit companies in Zhangjiang Science Park largely focus 
on manufacturing, testing and packaging ICs that are not at the cutting edge.192 This 
manufacturing base is now under threat as companies like Intel move production inland in 
search of lower wages and it is not yet clear whether Shanghai’s IC sector will be able to 
move into the higher value stages of value chain. 
Shanghai’s pharmaceutical sector is perhaps a more promising example of the way it 
will innovate in the future. Here again, openness has allowed it to attract the world’s top 
pharmaceutical companies to set up R&D centres, including Roche, AstraZenneca and 
GSK. As in the integrated circuit industry, these have focused so far on development rather 
than drug discovery, but GSK’s Shanghai operation is gradually moving to become its 
global centre for drug discovery in neurodegenerative diseases. This is complimented by 
universities such as Fudan (China’s number three), where life sciences accounted for 40 per 
cent of its publications between 2003 and 2012.193 
Shanghai’s weakness is its lack of SMEs and private enterprises. While Beijing’s 
Zhongguancun Science Park is dominated by small university spin outs and other 
start–ups, local government plans plus the lack of a university cluster have ensured that 
Shanghai’s Zhangjiang Science Park is dominated by large state–owned enterprises and 
foreign multinationals.194 
Guangdong
It is no coincidence that Huawei, one of China’s most successful private companies and 
global innovation brands, was founded in Guangdong province. Guangdong is home to 
three of the six special economic zones set up in the 1980s to engage with the market 
economy and the outside world. 
In their book Run of the Red Queen, Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree argue that the 
influence of the state on the direction of economic development – a strong feature of both 
Shanghai and Beijing’s innovation systems – is largely absent in Guangdong. It has taken a 
more hands off, unplanned approach, relying on foreign investment to flow into the most 
profitable industries. The result has been a strong focus on manufacturing and assembly 
for export, particularly in IT and telecoms.195 
This strategy has served Guangdong well, making it China’s richest province. But a 
combination of falling exports as a result of the financial crisis of 2008 and manufacturers 
relocating inland in response to wage inflation have hit Guangdong hard and resulted in 
thousands of factory closures and millions of job losses.
Application–focused R&D, which Guangdong is particularly strong in, may be the key to its 
future innovation model. Guangdong has traditionally been weak in basic research, with 
few world–class universities. R&D spending by businesses accounts for a larger proportion 
of total R&D than in any other region. This has led to practical, application focused R&D, 
and is the reason why Guangdong was granted 15.4 per cent of all invention patents in 2012 
(almost double the share granted to Shanghai).196 
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The role of innovation clusters and science parks
There is limited evaluation of the impact of science parks on innovation in China, but it’s 
clear there is a good deal of diversity in quality and impact. Some believe that science 
parks are largely focused on manufacturing and assembly and do not engage in research 
or innovation.197 However, others argue that science parks have a much broader role: they 
attract FDI, facilitate knowledge dissemination, and integrate regional activities into global 
value chains, which ultimately leads to technology upgrading and stimulates innovation.198 
Local governments are also keen to stimulate innovation within existing industrial clusters 
and provide funding and advice to that end with mixed success.199 The central government 
in 2013 announced the first batch of ten pilot innovative industrial clusters to stimulate 
innovation and industrial competitiveness within clusters and stimulate industrial upgrading 
of the industries located there.200 The plan states that a new batch of innovation clusters, 
which are to be based within existing national high–tech zones, will be announced each 
year. The first batch of innovation clusters are listed in Table 9.
Table 9: The first list of innovative industry cluster pilots
The role of universities in regional innovation 
Unlike many developed countries, universities in China are significant sources of patents 
as well as publications. Universities account for six of the top ten domestic Chinese 
institutions which were granted the most invention patents in 2012. And they are highly 
concentrated in activity: all but one of these is on the east coast.201 Research output is 
similarly concentrated on the east coast, which is home to eight out of China’s top ten 
most productive universities and all 15 of the institutions that produce the highest impact 
research.202 
Cluster location Focus
Beijing Zhongguancun  Mobile Internet
Baoding  New energy and smart grid equipment 
Benxi  Pharmaceuticals
Wuxi New District Intelligent sensing systems
Wenzhou  Lasers and Optoelectronics
Weifang  Light–emitting semiconductors
Wuhan East Lake High–tech Zone  National Geospatial information and application  
 services
Zhuzhou  Innovative rail transportation equipment   
 manufacturing
Shenzhen High–tech District  Next–generation Internet
Huizhou  Cloud computing and smart terminals
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Table 10. The ten Chinese universities (+CAS) with greatest publication output 2003–2012203  
 (average normalised citation impact, 2003–2011, pink indicates above national  
 average)
 
Table 11. China highest average citation impact institutions 2003–2011 and with >500   
 papers 2003–2012.206 Pink indicates normalised citation impact above the national  
 average
These institutions are pinpointed on the map on page 41.
 Output  % China total Impact
Zhejiang University 41,053 3.83 0.89
Tsinghua University 38,530 3.59 0.95
Chinese Acad Sciences, Graduate University204 37,121 3.46 0.95
Peking University 35,944 3.35 1.06
Chinese Academy of Sciences205  34,242 3.19 1.05
Shanghai Jiao Tong University 33,757 3.15 0.86
Fudan University 25,264 2.35 1.00
Nanjing University 23,562 2.20 0.94
University of Science and Technology of China 21,970 2.05 1.14
Sichuan University 20,071 1.87 0.75
Sun Yat–sen University 19,505 1.82 0.99
Shandong University 18,866 1.76 0.83
 Output Impact
National Centre for Nano–Sciences and Technology 963 2.09
Chinese Academy of Sciences/Beijing Institute of Genomics 593 1.97
Donghua University, Shanghai  1,484 1.76
Fuwai Hospital, Beijing 760 1.48
Chinese Academy of Sciences/Guangzhou Institute of Geochemistry 2,021 1.48
Chinese Academy of Sciences/Institute of Chemistry 7,856 1.45
Chinese Academy of Sciences/Changchun Inst Applied Chemistry 6,571 1.41
Chinese Academy of Sciences/Shanghai Inst Organic Chemistry 4,390 1.41
Chinese Academy of Sciences/Institute of Automation 1,093 1.38
Chinese Academy of Sciences/Institute of Theoretical Physics 1,984 1.33
Chinese Academy of Sciences/Institute of Earth Environment 749 1.32
Renmin University of China 1,610 1.32
Chinese Academy of Sciences/Institute of Physics 7,320 1.29
Chinese Academy of Geological Sciences (CAGS) 2,061 1.28
Chinese Academy of Sciences/Institute of High Energy Physics 4,470 1.27
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The ranking of the most research intensive cities is largely unchanged since 2003. However 
there has been an increase in activity and impact away from the traditional centres on the 
east coast. Figure 9 represents the spread and intensity of research across China since 
2003.
Figure 9. City–level distribution of research volume and impact in China, 2003-2011207  
 Size of bubbles indicates relative number of papers; intensity of  
 orange indicates relative average citation impact.
Qingdao
Chongqing
Lanzhou
Jinan
Dalian
Shenyang
Harbin
Changsha
Hefei
Changchun
Tianjin
Chengdu
Xian
Hong Kong
Guangzhou
Hangzhou
Wuhan
Nanjing
Shanghai
Beijing
Normalised Citation Impact
0.2 1.2
Paper Count 20032011 
100
1000
10000
100000
Data & analysis : Thomson Reuters
Zhengzhou
47  CHINA’S ABSORPTIVE STATE: RESEARCH, INNOVATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CHINA–UK COLLABORATION
 MANY CHINAS, MANY INNOVATION SYSTEMS
Future regional patterns of innovation
Two conflicting processes are at play across China’s innovation landscape. There is still a 
marked concentration of high–end outputs on the east coast, and its existing advantages 
give it a greater capacity to absorb knowledge and S&T funding. The government’s drive to 
place businesses at the centre of the S&T system is exacerbating regional concentrations 
of activity, as companies move to regions which have the best human capital and 
environment for innovation. A counter current to this is the steady flow of labour intensive 
manufacturing away from the east coast, which could eventually lead to technology 
upgrading and stimulate innovation. 
The east–west dichotomy is insufficient in explaining China’s geography of innovation, 
given the very different models of innovation across east coast cities and provinces. 
For instance, Beijing’s system is more focused on basic and applied research, driven by 
intensive government funding a strong university cluster. This compares to Shanghai’s 
government–driven focus on experimental development linked to a strong manufacturing 
base. In contrast, Guangdong’s approach is more private sector driven, with over 90 per 
cent of R&D funding from business. While the central government sets the overall policy 
context, targets and evaluation metrics, there is a considerable degree of autonomy in 
how to deliver on these goals, leading to very different interpretations of national policies. 
Even among China innovation analysts, opinions differ on whether reform is likely to 
lead to a greater degree of local autonomy and experimentation (e.g. Breznitz et al.) or 
whether in contrast we are likely to see a tightening up of central coordination to tackle the 
inefficiencies espoused in this approach (e.g. Cao et al.) In the next chapter, we consider 
the role that business and enterprise can play in this changing innovation mix.
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5: THE ENTERPRISE  
 OF INNOVATION
Baidu, the Chinese internet search company, announced in early 2013 that it would be 
setting up an artificial intelligence research lab in Cupertino, Silicon Valley later this year. 
Its Institute of Deep Learning (IDL) will seek to ‘simulate the functionality, the power, the 
intelligence of the human brain.’ This is a bold move by one of a cadre of leading Chinese 
companies, and is modelled in some respects on the investment in basic research in an 
earlier era by corporate giants like Bell Labs and Xerox PARC. 
Yet China’s answer to Google still has a long way to go to shake its reputation as an 
imitator of its American counterpart. China’s technology scene is packed with so–called 
‘C2C’ (Copy to China) companies, and importing, absorbing and digesting technologies 
and business models remains a prevalent feature of Chinese business. Some see this as a 
learning phase in the development of a business–led innovation system, but others suggest 
that China’s model of rapid adoption and absorption is fast becoming a value–adding 
specialism that will persist alongside more pioneering endeavours like those of Baidu’s IDL. 
In this chapter, we highlight the role of China’s vanguard global innovators, and review how 
entrepreneurship and innovation have developed in recent years across the rest of China’s 
business sector.
Global innovation brands
In 2008, the Booz and Company ranking of the leading 1,000 business R&D investors 
featured 15 Chinese companies. By 2012, 47 companies made the list (compared to an 
increase from four to nine Indian companies over the same period).208 Baidu ranks sixth 
in Forbes magazine’s analysis of the world’s most innovative companies, while fellow 
technology firm Tencent comes in at number 18.209 
Although the methodologies for rankings like these vary widely, there’s no doubt that 
a growing cadre of Chinese companies are now operating at the technological frontier. 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organisation, the ICT giant ZTE applied for 
more patents (PCT) in 2012 than any other company worldwide. Huawei came a close 
fourth in the global rankings.210 
Global leaders are not confined to ICT. In a supporting analysis as part of its China 
2030 report, the World Bank highlights the additional examples of Chinese excellence 
in “auto assembly and components, PVCs, biopharmaceuticals, nanotechnology, stem 
cell therapeutics, high density power batteries, high–speed trains, telecommunication 
equipment, wind turbines, single aisle passenger aircraft, booster rockets, space satellites, 
supercomputers, shipping containers, internet services, and electric power turbines.”211 
China’s ongoing but incomplete transition to an enterprise–led innovation system since 
1978 has been well documented by international agencies like the World Bank and OECD.212 
Rapid growth in R&D expenditure has largely been driven by the enterprise sector, 
which accounted for an above–OECD average 75 per cent of China’s R&D spend in 2011, 
compared to only 27 per cent in 1990 and 60 per cent in 2000.213 
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The role of state–owned enterprises (SOEs)
Understanding which businesses are driving innovative performance is somewhat clouded 
by the significant proportion of R&D expenditure by state–owned and state–controlled 
enterprises. As the table below suggests, they play a key role in certain technological areas 
such as high–speed rail and telecoms, although most SOEs operate outside of the most 
strategic emerging technology sectors.214 
Table 12: Top companies by R&D spending and type of ownership (2010)215
Source: State Enterprises: Reform or Die? Denis Simon (2012)
*1 billion RMB = US $163 million
Table 11, reproduced from a paper by Denis Simon, an expert on China’s S&T policies, 
lists Huawei and ZTE as private companies. However, there has been much speculation 
around Huawei’s links with the Chinese government, and while ZTE is a public company 
listed in Hong Kong, its main shareholders are a Chinese SOE and a former army unit.216 
This underlines the importance that the state and state–owned companies play in China’s 
innovation system. 
The most profitable are the so–called ‘central SOEs’, the 117 firms administrated by the 
State–owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which control 
assets equalling over 60 per cent of the country’s GDP.217 Eighty–eight of the 95 Chinese 
companies which made the 2013 Global 500 list of the world’s richest companies are SOEs. 
Two of these companies alone, China Mobile and China National Petroleum Corporation 
reported greater 2009 profits than China’s 500 most profitable private companies 
combined.218 
However, according to a controversial report from the Unirule Institute of Economics, a 
Chinese think tank, large subsidies have masked the performance of the vast majority 
of SOEs. Unirule calculates that, if all state subsidies were deducted from SOE returns, 
the average return on equity from 2001 to 2009 would have been –6.29 per cent.219 
SOEs accounted for 45 per cent of in–house R&D in industrial enterprises in 2009, and 
dominated spending on absorption and adaptation of foreign technology,220 but aren’t 
usually good at converting this into innovation output as measured by patents. According 
to an extensive World Bank survey, their R&D is likely to be unproductive and poorly 
integrated with the rest of their operations.221 
 Rank Company Ownership R&D spend 
   status ( bn RMB*)
 1 Huawei Technologies Private 16.6
 2 China Mobile Communications Corporation State 13.6
 3 China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation State 13.0
 4 China National Petroleum Corporation State 9.4
 5 Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation State 9.3
 6 China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation State 9.2
 7 China Railway Construction Corporation State 8.8
 8 China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation State 8.5
 9 China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation State 7.1
 10 ZTE Corporation Private 7.1
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Table 13: Patents applications and R&D performance of Industrial Enterprises, 2011222
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, 2012 Statistical Yearbook
SOEs control significant physical assets and human capital stocks and dominate FDI 
networks. While this results in pressure from national policymakers to reform and invest 
in R&D, a powerful elite within the SOEs is strongly incentivised to maintain the status 
quo. The monopoly position of many SOEs is also a considerable disincentive to innovate. 
Although consolidation and privatisation over the last few decades have enhanced the 
performance of many SOEs, there is an ongoing debate about the course of future reform 
for the more than 100,000 such entities which remain.223 
Analysts point to a trend of increased SOE openness towards investment, risk assessment 
and talent procurement that might increase effectiveness if sustained.224 While there is 
often concern about the role of heavily subsidised companies in creating unfair grounds 
for international competition,225 research has also explored the innovation–limiting effect of 
SOEs on small private companies in China. Advocates of reform hope that abolishing many 
of the perks enjoyed by SOEs would stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship among 
credit–disadvantaged private–sector SMEs.226 The government’s recent 2013 ‘mini–stimulus 
package’ is seen as a step in the right direction – creating credit streams and cutting taxes 
directly for SMEs (unlike the earlier 2008 stimulus package which was channelled through 
SOEs).227 
Financing innovation: support for innovative small business
The Chinese banking sector has not historically provided a supportive environment 
for innovation in small firms, and bank credit is tough to obtain for non state–owned 
companies. Direct public support to business R&D is also limited.228 Recent efforts to 
boost business R&D include significantly reducing corporate tax rates for high–technology 
companies, as well as an R&D tax credit introduced in 2010.229 
A major part of institutional efforts to support start–ups is the Torch Programme. As of 
2011, 89 high–tech zones are overseen by this national programme to develop high–tech 
industries, which has been in operation since 1988.230 While exact support varies from 
region to region, these zones contribute well over a third of national industrial output. 
Zhongguancun Science Park in Beijing is one such zone. It houses 41 colleges and 
universities, 206 research labs,231 67 state level key labs, 14,929 enterprises, over 400,000 
S&T personnel232 and receives over one–third of Chinese venture capital investment.233 
In recent years, the early–stage capital provided by the Torch programme and the 
Innovation Fund for Small Technology Based Firms234 (operational since 1999) has been 
supplemented by a growing venture capital industry. As of April 2012, 86 ‘VC leading funds’ 
 Patent applications R&D expenditure per  
  patent application (RMB)
State–owned enterprise 20,746 2,225,082
Private–owned domestic funded enterprise 111,705 845,083
Enterprises with funds from Hong Kong,  
Macao and Taiwan 41,595 1,347,334
Foreign funded enterprise 52,711 1,776,003
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– through which government provides investment guarantees, risk subsidy and follow–on 
investment – have been founded in China, with a collective capital of RMB 53.17 billion 
(US$8.69 billion). With over 100 firms registered in 2006, following the introduction of a 
favourable tax policy in 2007, the China Venture Capital Association now lists 882 VC firms. 
These are concentrated on the east coast.235 Recent analysis by Thomson Reuters suggests 
that while VC investment remains concentrated in the Bohai Region (which is centred 
on Beijing and Tianjin), the Yangtze River Delta Region (Shanghai, Jiangsu province and 
Zhejiang province) and the Pearl River Delta Region (Guangdong Province), activities are 
also expanding into Central and Western China. In these locations the competition for deal 
flow is less fierce and more favourable governmental incentives are available.236 
Funding is more likely to be at growth stage than seed stage. Global VC investment into 
China is also growing fast, particularly in healthcare and IT sectors. Until 2010, European 
companies consistently attracted more than double the VC investment of Chinese 
companies. As of 2011, Europe is only slightly ahead and is not expected to maintain its 
lead.237 An unfavourable global economic outlook has meant that VC investment slowed 
significantly in 2011–2012, but early indications are that the market is picking up again so far 
in 2013. 
Figure 10: Venture capital investments by year and origin 
Taken from Thomson One Investment Analytics database (July 2013)
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Flows of foreign technology
Although a focus on the attraction and absorption of foreign technology and ideas may 
seem at odds with the push for more home–grown, original innovation, in fact both are 
critical strands of China’s story. The role of foreign technology in China’s innovation system 
is evolving rather than diminishing.
World Bank data shows that in 1996, large and medium Chinese enterprises were spending 
almost 1.2 per cent of their revenue on the acquisition of foreign technology, whereas in 
2006 that had dropped to less than 0.2 per cent. Conversely, expenditure on R&D went 
from 0.4 per cent in 1995 to 0.8 per cent in 2006.238 
While China’s trade surplus in high–tech goods is growing,239 its balance of payments 
deficit for the use of foreign IP is also on the rise. World Bank data shows that in 2012 it 
received just over $1 billion in fees,240 but paid out over $17.7 billion, leading to a deficit of 
$16.7 billion. This compares to a payments surplus of over $80 billion in the USA.241 
Much analysis has been devoted to the increasing numbers of multinational R&D centres 
which levy a significant proportion of these charges. Estimates of the exact number of 
foreign–invested R&D centres in China vary, but according to official statistics from the 
Ministry of Finance there are now over 1,800 – more than double the number estimated in 
Demos’ 2007 study.242 These are now estimated to account for about 20 per cent of China’s 
R&D spending. 
The primary effect of importing foreign technology has been the dramatic expansion of 
China’s manufacturing capacity.243 However, it is well established in the innovation literature 
that such technology flows only lead to positive spillovers and productivity growth when 
the system has the capabilities and skills to absorb them.
Less analysis has been devoted to the recent growth in acquisitions of foreign R&D–
intensive companies. In a recent article for the Harvard Business Review, Peter Williamson 
describes how a buying spree was initially triggered by China’s accession to the WTO in 
2001, reinforced by then Premier Wen Jibao’s 2004 call on enterprises to ‘go global’. From 
$1.63 billion in 2003, Chinese cross–border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) peaked at just 
over $73 billion in 2008 before the global financial crisis.244 
While many early efforts to buy global brands and reputations ended in failure, Williamson 
suggests this was an important learning phase, and a new wave of M&A is now focused 
on ‘concrete assets such as mineral deposits and state of the art R&D facilities’.245 The 
motives for acquisition are as much about increasing domestic competitiveness as entering 
foreign markets. While it may not be surprising that Chinese companies have an interest in 
purchasing ‘distressed companies with advanced technology,’246 accessing the know–how, 
training and management expertise within those companies is becoming just as important 
as obtaining core technologies.247 
Incremental innovation at hyper speed
There is also growing interest from analysts in the quality and speed of incremental 
innovation. OECD analysis suggests that Chinese companies spend far more on technology 
renovation (defined as ‘the application of the latest technology to existing products, 
technology and equipment to improve production efficiency and quality’) than on R&D.248 
These ‘incremental’ efforts to adopt and adapt the latest technologies have been an 
important driver of China’s industrial development. While some analysts may be sceptical 
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of the longevity of these strategies for economic growth, others see them as an essential 
feature of China’s global competitiveness in technology. As Breznitz and Murphree 
describe, “Chinese technology companies shine by developing quickly enough to remain 
at the cusp of the global technology frontier without actually advancing the frontier 
itself.”249 This is a particularly valuable specialism as global value chains in research and 
development become more fragmented, with growing opportunities to capture the value 
of innovations a long way from the point of creation or conception.
The global energy giant BP has long–standing collaborations with China spanning the full 
spectrum of its innovation interests. Collaborative projects in China include a fundamental 
chemistry lab in Dalian; energy policy research with Tsinghua University; a Shanghai R&D 
lab; a clean energy commercialisation centre working on technology deployment; and a 
corporate venturing arm that has been operational for five years. 
Steve Cook, Strategy Advisor at BP, explains that while there are a range of motivations for 
each of these projects, China’s specialism in rapid experimentation is often undervalued 
as a benefit by foreign companies: “China is a great place to be empirical and learn by 
doing. The government is very keen to promote innovation and so small Chinese companies 
can get hold of factories rent free…There are also lots of service industries supporting 
this innovation drive. For example, it’s 10–20 times cheaper in China to build a prototype 
production line. It’s so cheap it’s almost disposable. This means you can experiment. There 
is a boiling cauldron of people just trying stuff.”250 
The blurring line between imitation and innovation
This ‘boiling cauldron’ includes a wide range of practices. One approach that has attracted 
some international attention is ‘shanzhai.’ Originally a term denoting bandit strongholds 
outside government control, today this is used to refer to businesses based on fake or 
pirated products. 
Until recently, shanzhai companies have been regarded as a negative influence on Chinese 
innovation, a source of substandard product ‘knock offs’ which openly infringe other 
companies’ IP rights. Yet others argue that shanzhai can be seen in a more positive guise, 
as a method that involves rapid iteration and adaptation, a deep understanding of user 
needs and often sophisticated manufacturing value chains. The consultancy Booz and 
Company suggests that shanzhai reflects a culture of ‘fearless experimentalism’ among 
Chinese manufacturers, and cites several cases of shanzhai companies evolving into 
disruptive innovators including the battery and car manufacturer BYD.251 
Similarly, in a 2010 special report on emerging economies, The Economist highlights the 
high levels of skill required to produce rapid copies of high–tech gadgets like smart phones 
at low cost, and to add new features like telephoto lenses or solar chargers that distinguish 
a product from its competition. While these bandit innovators are in some senses 
‘parasites,’ in others ‘(they) deploy as much innovation and ingenuity as their legitimate 
counterparts.’252 
Some business magazines already recommend the use of shanzhai methods by Western 
companies.253 Innovation scholars in China and the West are also trying to better 
understand positive lessons from shanzhai innovators.254 For Yonjiang Shi at the Cambridge 
Institute for Manufacturing, the phenomenon demonstrates the value of densely networked 
manufacturing clusters that support new market entrants, and the importance of a strong 
manufacturing base for absorptive capacity in innovation.255 For Keane et al., these 
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‘renegades on the frontier of innovation’ should be recognised as the leading edge of 
china’s creative economy; experts in a kind of rapid prototyping that is often absent from 
larger companies.256 Outside of manufacturing, some argue that shanzhai processes are 
now operating in other sectors, such as internet services and digital technology.
Making indigo from blue
As China’s digital economy has grown at breakneck speed, shanzhai practices appear 
to have become just as prevalent there. Examples include Taobao (the Chinese Ebay), 
RenRen (the Chinese Facebook) and Sina Weibo (the Chinese Twitter).257 In a recent study 
of Chinese technology entrepreneurship, Anna Maybank describes how copying is part of 
the development culture of the Chinese start–up community. A company learns by copying 
others, then iterates rapidly until it has a better or more locally effective product.258 
It was still seen by some as controversial when Chinese internet services giant Tencent 
– now the world’s third largest publicly traded internet company – was described by the 
magazine Fast Company as one of the world’s 50 most innovative companies.259 Tencent’s 
‘QQ’ instant messaging service started out as a direct copy of AOL’s ‘ICQ’ service. Yet 
unlike AOL, Tencent quickly learnt how to generate a revenue stream from QQ users, by 
permitting them to buy items of clothing for their chat avatars. Tencent was one of the 
pioneers of in–game payments, long before Silicon Valley’s Zynga hit upon the idea.260 In 
2007 it invested 100 million RMB ($16.34 billion) in setting up the first Chinese internet 
research institute. It now describes 50 per cent of its employees as R&D staff, and is hotly 
tipped to expand overseas with services such as WeChat, which ‘shares many features’ with 
the better known WhatsApp.261 
WeChat now counts 300 million users, more than 70 million of whom are outside mainland 
China. Unlike WhatsApp, WeChat is rapidly expanding into online payments in a market 
that is due to triple in size between 2011 and 2015.262 Anna Maybank’s research with the 
Chinese tech community characterises this imitation first, innovation later strategy as 
‘making indigo from blue’ – creating added value rather than a sub–standard copy. As 
one of her interviewees describes “You don’t have time to not copy. The pace is so fast. 
Economic growth is happening so fast. If you’re not quick enough, someone else will.”263 
China’s internet services industry is growing at over 20 per cent a year, and its number of 
internet users is increasing at almost 22 per cent a year.264 This growth alone accounts for 
246 million new internet users between 2007 and 2010 (with equivalent growth over this 
period in the US of only 22 million). While we’re likely to see many more cloned products 
being sucked in to this vortex of activity and scaled up, China is also set to become the 
source of far more breakthrough internet applications and services.265 
The internet services sector exemplifies China’s skilled absorption of ideas from around 
the world. A fast–changing sector with a burgeoning number of high quality private 
companies, it represents some of the most exciting aspects of China’s innovation system. 
While China’s internet companies have thrived despite the challenges posed by the ‘Great 
Firewall,’266 the world’s most extensive internet censorship operation, some argue that the 
recent governent campaign against ‘online rumours’, which has resulted in many arrests, 
threatens the future of some of China’s most innovative internet service companies.267 
In the digital economy, as in other emerging sectors, the next decade is likely to see this 
top tier of Chinese companies further cement their global brand presence, expand their 
international markets, and combine expanding in–house R&D capabilities with an existing 
and rapid capacity to absorb and adapt ideas from elsewhere. For the UK, the strategic 
question is what role our companies and innovators should play in this process; in working 
with Chinese partners to make indigo from blue.
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6: REBALANCING GROWTH 
At a press briefing following the most recent US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, 
Lou Jiwei, China’s finance minister, raised the eyebrows of his American audience when 
he said that China was aiming for a 7 per cent growth rate in 2013. Until that point, the 
official target had been 7.5 per cent, (itself a notch below the 8 per cent target, which held 
firm until 2011, giving rise to the official mantra ‘baoba’ or ‘maintain eight’). The following 
day, China’s Xinhua news agency quietly revised the minister’s remarks back up to 7.5 per 
cent. It may simply have been the jet lag talking, but as the Financial Times reported: “Mr 
Lou’s mistake was in fact deeply revealing: China’s official growth target is manifestly less 
important in Beijing today than at any time in the past decade.”268 
Six years earlier, Wen Jiabao as premier acknowledged that China’s economy was 
increasingly ‘unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable.’269 These 
came to be known as the ‘Four Uns’, and the 12th Five Year Plan was directed towards 
tackling them. Growth is certainly weakening: the latest GDP figures suggest that 2013 may 
be the first year since the 1997 Asian financial crisis when China fails to meet its official 
targets.270 
After three decades of rapid economic growth, debate is intensifying about how its 
economy can be rebalanced, and how growth relates to social progress and environmental 
sustainability. Stephen Roach, former Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, describes how 
“China is at an important juncture in its development journey. It is determined to move 
away from the quantity dimension of growth to a new focus on the quality of economic 
development. This is not only about a downshift in GDP growth: it is also a critical shift 
toward the long dormant Chinese consumer.”271 
China’s economic rebalancing will have significant implications for the future of its 
innovation system. This chapter explores three dimensions of this shift: 
• Towards more demanding, empowered consumers and the growth of user–driven 
innovation;
• Towards a sharper focus on resource consumption, environmental impacts, and the 
need for low–carbon and sustainable innovation;
• Towards a more vocal and proactive civil society, which is calling for new forms of 
social innovation.
Consumer and user–driven innovation
The rates of growth described above mean that by 2020 China’s GDP will account for 
19 per cent of world economic output, up from just 9 per cent in 2010. But what will be 
different about the next phase of growth is that it will be predominantly driven by domestic 
consumption, rather than exports and investments.272
While the average per capita spending power of Chinese consumers is forecast to remain 
relatively low for some time to come, the GDP of many of China’s leading cities already 
equals that of entire European economies. McKinsey‘s research on Chinese consumer 
markets reveals that the upper middle class, the proportion of the population that drives 
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consumer spending and shapes product preferences will grow from 14 per cent in 2012 to 
56 per cent by 2022.273 
There are many implications of this shift in consumer spending power, but two stand out 
as far as innovation is concerned: first, how consumer markets are shaping the demand for 
innovation; and second, how companies are tapping the innovative power of consumers as 
a source of competitive advantage.
Consumer–focused multinationals have long been conscious that their future is likely to 
hinge on the Chinese market. Healthcare is a prime example. China’s national spending on 
healthcare is predicted to hit $1 trillion in 2020, up from $357 billion in 2011.274 According to 
McKinsey, since 2006, 13 of the top 20 pharmaceutical multinationals have established R&D 
centres in China, and global medical device companies like GE and Johnson & Johnson are 
all looking to grow their market share. 
Yet market access can be complex, and multinationals are learning that regional 
interpretations of national plans can lead to diverse local markets. Huge volume markets, 
increasingly demanding consumers and fierce competition is likely to fuel experimentation 
and innovation within the sector. And with China’s population of over 65s due to double by 
2030 to 223 million, the prospects even within ‘niche’ sectors can look dramatic.
A different angle on the role of consumers in Chinese innovation is how companies can 
actively use consumer knowledge, input and feedback to shape the innovation process: 
what is commonly referred to as user–led innovation.275 There have been several high–
profile examples of Chinese companies getting this right. For example, the extraordinary 
growth of consumer goods company Haier has been driven by experimentation in niche 
markets based on consumer feedback.276 In the late 1990s, the company received a series 
of complaints from customers in Sichuan province that washing machines were becoming 
clogged and breaking down. On investigation, the cause was revealed to be farmers using 
the machines to wash sweet potatoes.277 In response, Haier created a new washing machine 
that, in addition to washing clothes, had a cycle that cleaned potatoes, fruit and shells. The 
first 10,000 machines were sold almost overnight. 
Tech company Xiaomi is another example of a company tapping user development 
capabilities and feedback to inform its innovation strategy. The extraordinary growth this 
private company has demonstrated since it was founded in 2010 has seen it valued at over 
$10 billion USD in 2013. Developing high–spec mobile phone handsets for sale at low cost, 
it provides added services and applications on a customised platform in a similar approach 
to Amazon’s Kindle offering. Often referred to as the ‘Apple of China’, its growth trajectory 
is supported by harnessing the power of user–feedback combined with innovative 
marketing. Xiaomi handsets use a customised version of Android called MIUI that their 
engineers update on a weekly basis with features suggested by a huge and loyal customer 
following.
Another potential area for user–led innovation in China is 3D printing. Astronauts on 
China’s Shenzhou spacecraft recently perched on 3D printed seats, and in August 2013, 
Chinese scientists announced the creation of 3D bioprinted organs.278 While it is unclear 
whether 3D printing will live up to its revolutionary hype, there is consensus that so called 
‘mass customisation’ – manufacturing of niche prototype products in small batches by both 
experts and home enthusiasts – could be a significant source of new product innovation. 
After a slow start, 3D printing is likely to take off in China as much as it has in the more 
developed economies of Japan, US and the UK. At the 2012 World 3D printing conference 
in Beijing, Luo Jun, CEO of Beijing’s Asian Manufacturing Association (AMA), predicted that 
revenues from Chinese 3D printing companies will reach 10 billion RMB (US $1.6 billion) 
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within three years.279 The AMA plans to build 3D printing innovation centres in ten cities 
across China, and the technology has now been incorporated into a national strategy by 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.
Low–carbon and sustainable innovation
In his final speech to the National People’s Congress in March 2013, Wen Jiabao spoke of 
the ‘sharpening contradictions’ between economic growth and the environment. These are 
contradictions of which China’s citizens are only too aware. Sixteen of the world’s 20 most 
polluted cities are in China and a recent study in The Lancet suggested that air pollution 
caused around 1.2 million premature deaths in 2010 alone.280 One of the most popular iPad 
apps in Beijing is the ‘China Air Quality Index’, and public outcry scaled new heights in 
January 2013 when, for several days, the concentration of fine particles in the capital’s air 
peaked at 886 μg/m3, almost 40 times the World Health Organisation limit for acceptable 
daily exposure. By contrast, levels in central London average around 13.5 μg/m3.281 Another 
study, published in July 2013 in the Proceedings of the US National Academy of Sciences, 
revealed that people in southern China have been living on average five years longer than 
their northern counterparts because of the health effects of pollution.282 
An ambitious plan to cut pollution and improve air quality in the north of China by 2017 has 
now been put in place, backed by 1.7 trillion RMB (US $289 billion) of state investment.283 
But air pollution is only one of a host of environmental problems that the country is 
confronting, and which are set to worsen in the decades ahead. In a frank interview in 
2005, Pan Yue, now China’s vice minister for environmental protection, outlined the threat 
that environmental constraints pose to China’s model of growth: “This miracle will end soon 
because the environment can no longer keep pace….Acid rain is falling on one–third of our 
territory; half of the water in China’s seven largest rivers is completely useless; a quarter of 
our citizens lack access to clean drinking water; a third of the urban population is breathing 
polluted air.”284 Other equally serious issues China faces include desertification caused by 
overuse of land, soil contamination with heavy metals and habitat and biodiversity loss. 
Since 2006, China has been the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gasses285 (though it 
only ranks 61st in the world by per capita emissions.)286 China is at the sharp end of many of 
the impacts of a changing climate. The 12th Five Year Plan avoided imposing firm limits on 
total carbon emissions, but included some ambitious goals for 2015 in relation to energy 
efficiency: to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16 per cent; and emissions per 
unit of GDP by 17 per cent. It also set a target to increase the proportion of non–fossil fuels 
in the energy mix from 8.3 per cent to 11.4 per cent by 2015. Early signs are that these goals 
will be met: recent figures from the NDRC show that in 2012, China’s carbon intensity fell 
by 5 per cent (outperforming its 1.5 per cent target) and its energy intensity fell by 3.6 per 
cent.287 
In part, this is being achieved through an effort to broaden the energy mix. China is pouring 
resources into clean energy, and now ranks first in the world in terms of its generation 
capacity for renewable electricity. In 2012, it invested US $65.1 billion in renewables; a 20 
per cent increase on the year before.288 Of this amount, US $31.2 billion went into solar 
energy (around 25 per cent of that year’s entire global investment) and the Chinese 
government recently announced plans to install a further 35 GW of solar power capacity 
by 2015.289 Installed wind power capacity has also risen fast, reaching 63 GW in 2012, and is 
expected to reach 100 GW by 2015.290 Investment in new nuclear power is also increasing, 
with 17 commercial reactors now operating, and 28 more under construction, capable of 
producing a total of 58 GW of power by 2020.291 
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THE SUN GOES OUT ON SUNTECH
Just before the financial crisis in 2008, Shi Zhenrong, founder of solar panel 
manufacturer Suntech Power said “We believe that in ten years, Suntech will be an 
energy giant like BP or Shell today.”292 His enthusiasm seemed well placed and by 2011, 
Suntech had become the world’s largest solar panel manufacturer by sales.293 Fast 
forward just two years and its dreams have been dashed by bankruptcy.294 
Suntech’s rise, from a start–up company founded in 2001 by a returnee with a PhD from 
Australia, to the world’s number one manufacturer of solar panels was largely achieved 
with government support in the form of tax subsidies and access to cheap finance. 
At the end of 2011, Suntech owed Chinese banks $2.3 billion,295 one of many solar 
companies which in total received $32.6 billion from Chinese banks in 2010.296 
Consequently, by 2011, China had a solar production capacity of 50GW, compared to 
a total world installed solar capacity of 27GW.297 This oversupply caused a massive fall 
in the price of solar panels, of almost 50 per cent in 2011 alone.298 Add to this weak 
demand resulting from many European countries cutting their solar feed in tariffs and 
the US placing barriers on Chinese solar panel imports, and Suntech’s losses quickly 
started to mount.299 
The problems facing Suntech are not limited to solar panels. In 2011, the production 
capacity of Chinese wind turbine manufacturers almost equalled the total global 
installed wind capacity.300 Suntech’s bankruptcy shows that the central government 
is starting to deal with issues of overcapacity, but local governments are reluctant to 
cease support to unprofitable companies because of the local jobs they create. Bigger 
changes are anticipated on the demand side, with central government announcing plans 
in 2013 to quadruple domestic solar generation capacity by 2015.301 
Despite impressive progress, the challenges involved in moving China’s economy onto 
a cleaner, low–carbon and more sustainable path remain substantial.302 Demand for coal 
is expected to increase by 50–60 per cent over the next two decades before it plateaus, 
and a recent report commissioned by Greenpeace included China prominently in a list of 
projects that will act as ‘carbon bombs’, citing plans by five of its north–western provinces 
to increase coal production, generating a further 1.4 billion tonnes of emissions a year.303 
The incoming leadership, which is well aware of China’s environmental problems, quickly 
declared ‘ecological progress’ to be one of its priorities. In his debut press conference as 
premier, Li Keqiang pledged to “upgrade China’s development model to enable people to 
enjoy clean air, safe drinking water and food.”304 It is expected that pollution control and 
other environmental measures will receive greater priority in the next Five Year Plan, which 
will take effect from 2016. Ahead of that, there is speculation that China will sign up to a 
binding target for reducing carbon emissions, which could ease the current impasse in 
international climate negotiations.305 Already, China is piloting emissions trading schemes 
in seven cities and provinces (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hubei and 
Shenzhen), which are intended to build towards a national scheme after 2015.306 
In an attempt to address China’s environmental problems, the former leadership attempted 
to measure China’s ‘Green GDP’, or GDP minus the costs of environmental damage. In 
2006, the National Bureau of Statistics released the figures for 2004, which showed that 
environmental damage had cost China 3 per cent of its GDP that year. While this is a huge 
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loss, at around US $58 billion, some have even called it an underestimate. However, the 
project was killed off by political opposition in its second year, and efforts to revive it have 
so far been unsuccessful.307 
Other schemes to boost sustainability include China’s plans to build low–carbon and smart 
cities. Thirteen jurisdictions have now been designated as low–carbon economy pilot 
zones, able to experiment with different policies and approaches at a local level.308 And in 
August 2013, the government launched a smart city programme with nine pilot cities.309 
This fast–changing policy context means that low–carbon, sustainable innovation can 
only grow in importance over the next decade, creating particular trade and collaborative 
research opportunities for the UK and other countries. Current patterns of US–China trade 
in clean energy technologies illustrate this point: in 2011, this market was worth a total of 
US$ 8.5 billion, with US exports to China exceeding imports by US$ 1.63 billion.310 
Social innovation 
Local air quality and environmental pollution has been one of the causes of more visible 
public unrest over the past five years that has alarmed China’s leadership. During the 
period of the 11th Five Year Plan, the Ministry of Environmental Protection received 
300,000 petitions on environmental issues. Such protests increasingly spill onto the 
streets: in May 2013, Kunming became the site for environmental demonstrations against 
the nearby construction of an oil and chemical refinery;311 and in July 2013, a rare protest 
against nuclear power took place in Jiangmen, Guangdong province, prompting the local 
government to agree to halt plans to build a uranium–processing facility.312 
These are local manifestations of a broader and significant trend: towards a more visible 
and proactive civil society in China, demanding a greater say in how policies are made and 
institutions are run.313 Speaking recently to the Financial Times, Gao Bingzhing, director of 
the Centre for Civil Society Studies at Peking University, explained that “Civil society has 
already become very firm and deep–rooted in China…The transformation of civil society into 
political demands is a general phenomenon. China is no exception.”314 
Estimates suggest there are over 620,000 NGOs in China today,315 a number that grew 
rapidly following the devastating 2008 Sichuan earthquake. In an article for the Stanford 
Social Innovation Review, Meng Zhao identifies 2011 as a turning point in the development 
of the non–profit sector, with the end of the complex ‘dual administration’ system which 
restricted the registration of new non–profit entities in a landscape dominated by GONGOs 
(government–owned NGOs).316 Yet the government’s instinctive distrust of civil society has 
created a uniquely Chinese model whereby the government tries to create and manage 
social innovation.317 
A more vibrant civil society, allied to growing public support for social and environmental 
goals, has promoted a lively debate about what social innovation (a concept now 
of interest worldwide) means in the Chinese context.318 In one sense, China has an 
extraordinary story of social progress to tell. Its rapid growth has lifted well over 600 
million people out over poverty since 1981.319 But inequality has risen dramatically alongside 
this, and while official Chinese statistics show a Gini coefficient on a par with the US, other 
estimates suggest the gap is greater.320 A fresh round of social reforms were announced in 
February 2013, yet analysts suggest that there may be roadblocks to implementing these.321 
The latest policy guidance for indigenous innovation talks of stepping up efforts to 
‘improve innovation capabilities in key social fields’ – with an emphasis on education 
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and digital technology, healthcare systems and technologies, public safety and disaster 
management and the ‘modern cultural industry system’, which covers industries ranging 
from publishing and printing to online games and animation.322 
While the concept of ‘social innovation’ is far from widespread in China, it does have its 
champions.323 Beijing University’s Professor Yu Keping has collected extensive case studies 
of ‘innovations and excellence in local government’.324 There are now annual awards for 
best practice, with examples this year including Minxin Net in Liaoning Province, an online 
platform for the registration of public complaints and NPI, an incubator in Shanghai’s 
Pudong district, which markets itself as a social innovation park.325 
Various approaches to social innovation are being experimented with across civil society, 
including crowdfunding,326 microcredit and time banks.327 Yet despite these and other 
pioneering projects, there is still a long way to go before China develops its own distinctive 
and thriving culture of social innovation. Deng Guosheng, Director of the Center for 
Innovation and Social Responsibility at Tsinghua University, suggests that proper funding 
and a supportive policy environment are still lacking.328 
Just like technological innovation, social innovations can be incremental or radical.329 As in 
other domains of innovation, China is increasingly adept at copying and absorbing models 
of social innovation from elsewhere and making incremental improvements to them to suit 
the Chinese context, but has not yet pioneered many of its own. But this will change rapidly 
in the next ten years as social innovation takes off in China and new models start to appear. 
All of these shifts create exciting opportunities for the UK, which has deep strengths 
in design, branding, advertising and in understanding consumers; has long been at the 
forefront of environmental technologies and regulation; and has pioneered emerging 
models and practices of social innovation. With careful planning and positioning, the UK 
could become a crucial ally and business partner for China on its journey to a rebalanced, 
more sustainable and socially cohesive economy.
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7: INNOVATION DIPLOMACY AND  
 COLLABORATION 
The development of science and technology requires extensive 
international cooperation. Science and technology have no 
nationality!”
President Xi Jinping, 2012330
Until recently, Sunnylands, a 200–acre luxury estate in Rancho Mirage, California, was best 
known as the venue for Frank Sinatra’s wedding to Barbara Marx in 1976; the fourth, last 
and longest of his marriages.331 But in June 2013, it provided the backdrop for the start of 
another new relationship: the first summit between Barack Obama and Xi Jinping. 
Topics on the eight–hour agenda included North Korea, climate change and cyber security, 
and although discussions were somewhat overshadowed by breaking revelations of the 
USA’s own programme of state–sponsored cyber espionage,332 the summit was regarded as 
a success. In the press conference that followed, President Xi observed that “China and the 
United States must find a new path – one that is different from the inevitable confrontation 
and conflict between the major countries of the past.”333 Harvard political scientist Joseph 
Nye described it as “the most important meeting between an American president and a 
Chinese leader in 40 years, since Nixon and Mao.”334 
For seasoned observers, one striking aspect of the lead–up to the Sunnylands summit was 
the repeated reference by Chinese officials to a ‘new type of great–power relationship’ 
between China and the United States. This idea – xinxing daguo guanxi – was first 
elaborated by Xi in a speech he gave in Washington DC in February 2012, when he was 
still vice–president.335 Xi explained then that such a relationship would be characterised by 
“mutual understanding and strategic trust, respecting each other’s core interests, mutually 
beneficial cooperation and enhancing cooperation and coordination in international affairs 
and on global issues.”336 As a concept, the ‘new type of great power relationship’ remains 
vague but signals a heightened level of confidence and ambition. 
In line with Xi’s broader narrative of ‘the great renaissance,’, it suggests that the advice of 
the late Deng Xiaoping that China should “hide its brilliance and bide its time” has been 
discarded in favour of a more assertive relationship with other nations. It is a realignment 
that is far from complete: one recent and influential analysis insists China is still a ‘partial’ 
power.337 “China is a global actor without (yet) being a true global power”, argues David 
Shambaugh. “It remains a long way from becoming a global superpower like the United 
States (which has comprehensive power and global influence across economic, cultural, 
diplomatic, security, governance, and other realms).”338
But what do these broader developments in China’s foreign policy mean for its approach 
to collaboration in science, technology and innovation? While science and technology may 
have ‘no nationality’, for governments seeking to secure its future contribution to economic 
growth and competitiveness, national perspectives are vital. US–China is set to remain a 
dominant geopolitical axis, but around the world countries are seeking to understand what 
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a more strategic relationship with China in science and innovation would entail. A shift 
is underway from established agendas of ‘science diplomacy’339 – focused on promoting 
academic research collaborations – to the more expansive and sometimes treacherous 
terrain of ‘innovation diplomacy’, in which collaborative opportunities and risks need to be 
assessed across every link in the innovation value chain.
While other countries recalibrate their approach, China’s approach to international 
collaboration is increasingly strategic. Since China’s ‘opening up’ in 1978, foreign policy has 
long been used to advance economic development, with what David Shambaugh describes 
as “overriding emphasis…placed on those nations that could provide China with advanced 
technology, FDI, expertise, and export markets.” Other powers, argues Shambaugh “do not 
devote diplomatic resources in pursuit of economic ends anywhere near the extent that 
China does.” Similarly, Adam Segal from the US Council on Foreign Relations notes that 
“One of China’s great strengths has been a laser–like focus on shaping foreign interactions 
to serve national innovation goals.”340 This strategic approach to collaboration is an 
important feature of China’s absorptive state.
In this chapter, we look in more detail at China’s approach, and how this is shaping the 
spread and intensity of its global research and innovation relationships. Against this 
backdrop, we draw on the latest bibliometric data for an in–depth assessment of the health 
of China–UK relations in research. We present new data which reveals that the UK has 
moved ahead of Japan to become the second most popular ‘partner of choice’ for Chinese 
researchers (with only the US producing more co–authored papers). Finally, we draw 
comparisons with the approaches of the US, Australia, Germany and the European Union 
to collaboration with China, and ask is there anything the UK can learn from these other 
national strategies? 
China’s approach to international collaboration in research and innovation
In August 2012, more than 2,000 astronomers from 80 countries gathered in Beijing for 
the 28th General Assembly of the International Astronomical Union (IAU). It was the largest 
meeting in the IAU’s history, and its opening speaker was none other than Xi Jinping.341 
After welcoming the delegates, Xi set out five ingredients of successful science and 
technology, the last of which was international cooperation. As he explained: “Nowadays 
the challenges for science and technology are more and more globalised…and these 
common problems require scientific exchanges and cooperation in various forms.”342 
This philosophy has shaped China’s approach to science and technology collaboration 
for more than 30 years, with impressive results. An ever–intensifying web of international 
connections has spread across every aspect of China’s innovation system – from joint 
academic research to technology transfer and licensing, FDI, mergers and acquisitions. 
As a result, the Chinese system is densely connected to sources of expertise elsewhere 
(in science, but also design, management, branding and core technologies). This has been 
a crucial factor in the rise of China’s absorptive state. One thing that marks out China’s 
innovation pathway from that of Japan or South Korea is its willingness, where necessary 
‘to buy expertise off the shelf’.343 Time and again, we see examples of highly targeted 
collaborations in research and innovation.344 
By the end of 2010, China had established formal S&T relations with 152 countries 
and regions and signed 104 cooperation agreements. It also had 141 S&T diplomats 
working across 46 countries.345 Denis Simon describes five shifts in China’s approach 
to international cooperation since the publication of the 2006 Medium and Long–term 
National Plan for Science and Technology Development (MLP):
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• From general international S&T cooperation to proactive, targeted cooperation 
focused on the needs and mission of the MLP;
• From project–based collaboration to ‘the integration of projects, talent and R&D 
base’s’;
• From an orientation to technology imports to a combined process of ‘inviting in’ and 
‘going abroad’;
• From cooperation driven by government to cooperation driven by multiple players;
• From bottom–up to top–down project identification and approval in line with the 
requirements of the MLP.346 
These shifts have occurred at a time when international cooperation in science and 
innovation has never been more important. The Royal Society’s Knowledge, Networks 
and Nations report maps this increasingly interconnected and multipolar scientific 
world, in which over 35 per cent of articles published in international journals involve 
collaborations across borders, up from 25 per cent in the mid–1990s.347 In a recent Nature 
commentary, Jonathan Adams argued that we are entering a “fourth age of research, 
driven by international collaboration between elite research groups.” Based on an analysis 
of 25 million papers published between 1981 and 2012, Adams demonstrates that the 
citation impact of collaborative papers is consistently higher than those that are entirely 
‘home–grown’. As a result, “institutions that do not form international collaborations risk 
progressive disenfranchisement, and countries that do not nurture their talent will lose out 
entirely.”348 
Over this period, the dramatic growth in China’s research output has been driven primarily 
by increased domestic activity. Papers on which there are only Chinese authors have 
consistently made up about three–quarters of China’s total output, with around a quarter 
having co–authors from one or more countries. This is a very different pattern from that of 
G7 countries where most of the growth in the last 20 years has been through international 
collaboration. For example, the number of UK papers with authors only from the UK fell 
below half of the country’s total national research output in 2010. 
But as China continues to expand its research volume so it has increased its potential to 
collaborate. In line with the shifts described by Denis Simon, it is also starting to become 
more selective about where it sources its knowledge and focusing on partners who can 
make a significant collaborative contribution. 
As the world’s largest and best–performing research power, the US has long been a 
favoured partner. US collaboration with China is much higher than for other nations, as 
displayed in Figure 11 (p.64). Over the past decade, US–China collaboration has increased 
relative to total China output: that is to say, it now accounts for a bigger share of a bigger 
pot. In 2011, more than 10 per cent of China’s papers had a US co–author. The UK has also 
slightly increased its collaborative share of China’s output, to around 2.5 per cent, and has 
recently moved ahead of Japan as China’s second most popular research partner. Other 
leading European nations (Germany and France) have fallen slightly in their collaborative 
share to below 2 per cent. Canada’s share is now rising after a marked dip in 1990s, but 
that dip was in share and not in absolute volume. 
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Figure 11. China’s research co–authorship with leading Western research economies349
The data suggest the UK is in a favourable position compared to other nations seeking links 
into China. Yet it is important to reflect on how long this can last, as maintaining the UK’s 
share of China’s activity is absorbing an increasing part of the UK’s limited collaborative 
capacity (Figure 12).
Figure 12. China–UK collaboration as a share of each country’s total output350
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Figure 13. China’s research co–authorship with Asia–Pacific research economies  
 (UK included for reference)351
China’s collaboration with other Asia–Pacific nations is shown in Figure 13. Japan’s 
collaborative share was ahead of the UK but has dipped sharply. By contrast, Australia’s 
collaboration has doubled as a share of China output over 20 years and is now ahead of 
Germany, with a share approaching that of the UK. Collaboration with the smaller research 
economies of South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan is growing but has flattened slightly at 
around 1 per cent each, possibly limited by the size and therefore the collaborative capacity 
of those nations. 
Competing in the ‘global race’: the UK’s approach to collaboration
In his speech to the 2012 Conservative Party conference, Prime Minister David Cameron 
offered what he felt were tough truths to the British people: “We are in a global race 
today. And that means an hour of reckoning for countries like ours. Sink or swim. Do or 
decline.” He went on to contrast his participation in “European Council meetings where 
we talk endlessly about Greece…while on the other side of the world, China is moving so 
fast it’s creating a new economy the size of Greece every three months.”352 This idea of the 
‘global race’ is now a recurring motif of UK government announcements on growth, trade 
and globalisation, and influences the way in which the opportunities and challenges of 
collaboration with China are understood. 
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The main framework for UK policy in this area is the December 2011 Innovation and 
Research Strategy for Growth.353 It acknowledges that ‘the UK’s position as a global leader 
in innovation and research depends on an internationally mobile and highly collaborative 
research workforce’ and it sets out five pillars of international engagement: 
• Promoting the UK’s research and high–technology sectors overseas; 
• Supporting UK businesses’ and researchers’ access to international markets and 
collaboration; 
• Ensuring the UK continues to attract globally mobile capital, technology and highly–
skilled people; 
• Strengthening our engagement with initiatives within the European Single Market; 
and 
• Building strategic links with high–growth economies. 
Unsurprisingly, China is highlighted as one of the high–growth economies with which the 
UK wants to increase its volume of collaborative activity. On China specifically, the strategy 
notes the broadening range of science and innovation relationships with China, but says 
“urgent action is needed to achieve more strategic engagement, aiming for a step change 
in our engagement with China’s science and innovation systems by 2020.” It lists four 
specific initiatives in support of this objective: 
• Encouraging the UK’s new Catapult Centres to build relationships with the Chinese 
‘TORCH’ innovation centres for mutual benefit, as they become established; 
• Expanding UKTI’s Enabling Innovation UK–China Partnership in ICT; 
• Using the new Beijing representative of the Intellectual Property Office to help UK 
businesses gain the knowledge they need to operate in the Chinese IP environment 
and to press for further improvements;
• Engaging with the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology in a jointly funded 
pilot initiative to support bilateral research projects in key areas of mutual interest.
Assessing the health of the current China–UK relationship in research and innovation is 
challenging given the limited range of available and comparable data. Later in this chapter 
we assess factors such as trade and institutional presence, but first we examine the health 
of research collaboration between China and the UK. 
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China–UK collaborative research
China and the UK have a strong research relationship, supported by a network of bottom–
up, researcher–led collaborations and a growing number of joint funding initiatives. These 
have contributed, in 2012, to the UK becoming China’s second largest research collaborator 
in terms of co–authored papers. The volume of collaborative output has increased four–
fold (x 4.2) over the period 2003 to 2012 from around 1,000 papers per year to over 4,500 
papers in the last year.354 
Figure 14. China–UK collaboration showing split by bilateral and multinational papers355
While international teams account for a considerable share of these papers, more than half 
of the China–UK joint papers of the last ten years are bilateral: that is, they had only UK and 
Chinese co–authors. In 2012, about 2,000 (around 40 per cent) of the China–UK papers 
published in that year had additional co–authors from other countries (Figure 14).
UK universities which collaborate the most with China, and Chinese universities which 
collaborate the most with the UK can be seen in Table 14. UK collaboration in China is 
spread less intensively across more institutions, while in the UK it is relatively concentrated. 
There are, in fact, more than 50 Chinese universities that have at least 100 China–UK co–
authorships in the last ten years and a further 50 with over 50 collaborative papers.
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Table 14. Institutions that are frequent co–authors on China–UK collaborative papers   
 (2003–2012) and the average normalised citation impact of the co–authored  
 papers356
Major fields of research collaboration
Research collaboration between the UK and China is not evenly spread across fields. 
Figure 15 shows the spread by ESI field, and the trajectory of growth in collaboration over 
the last ten years. As might be anticipated from the wider balance of China’s research 
efforts, Engineering (4,272 total China–UK papers for 2002–2012), Physics (3,204), Clinical 
Medicine (2,558), Chemistry (1,995) and Materials Science (1,458) are the categories with 
by far the largest number of collaborative papers. No other field exceeds 250 papers per 
year, but Geosciences and Computer Science are on track to do so in 2013.
The fields with the most rapidly growing China–UK collaboration are generally in the 
biomedical sciences: Molecular Biology and Genetics, Immunology, Pharmacology and 
Toxicology and Clinical Medicine all have above average growth. In addition, China–UK co–
authorship in Economics and Business and Social Sciences has also grown four–fold in the 
period. 
 Papers Average  Papers Average 
UK institution with citation China institution with citation 
 China impact  UK impact
Imperial College London 2,041 2.36 Peking University 1,176 2.28
University of Manchester 1,942 2.06 Chinese Acad Sciences 1,004 2.04
University of Oxford 1,687 3.48 Tsinghua University 929 2.25
University of Birmingham 1,556 2.58 CAS Univ of Sci and Technol 903 3.08
University of Cambridge 1,521 3.53 Zhejiang University 669 1.54
University College London 1,370 2.93 Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ 594 1.76
University of Liverpool 1,079 2.64 Fudan University 578 1.44
University of Edinburgh 1,045 3.90 CAS Graduate University 539 1.26
STFC R’ford Appleton Lab 1,002 4.45 Sun Yat–sen University 509 2.72
University of Bristol 994 2.30 CAS Inst High Energy Phys 493 2.86
Brunel University 965 3.00 Nanjing University 434 2.79
Univ of Southampton 919 3.11 Xi’an Jiaotong University 409 0.92
Queen Mary Univ London 802 2.22 Harbin Inst Technology 406 2.05
University of Sheffield 796 3.97 Shandong University 389 2.81
King’s College London 718 1.90 CAS Nat’l Astronom Obs 305 1.62
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Figure 15. Growth of China–UK collaboration by ESI field357
Another perspective on indexing the relative intensity of China–UK research co–authorship 
is to calculate the percentage of the total output in each field nationally that is accounted 
for by papers that are the result of international collaborations. This is done in Table 15 for 
a recent five–year window (2007–2011) where we can readily compare collaborative papers 
with the national background.
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Table 15. China–UK co–authorship for 2007–2011 and as a percentage of each country’s  
 total output in each ESI journal category358
 
 
China–UK collaboration in Materials Science and in Engineering already takes up an above 
average percentage of UK capacity, accounting respectively for 6.7 per cent and 8.4 per 
cent of UK papers against around 2.5 per cent overall. Similarly, Plant and Animal Sciences 
are an existing area of relatively intense collaboration for both countries (7–8 per cent for 
each) whereas Physics co–authorship only accounts for a relatively small percentage of 
each country’s papers.
From China’s perspective, the Materials Science collaboration is a small part (1.2 per cent) 
of total national activity. This means that even though the UK appears to be strongly 
engaged, it is in fact only working with a relatively small part of China’s total capacity in 
this area. At the same time, a substantial part of the UK’s capacity is already taken up. 
The same dynamic applies in Chemistry, and reflects a potential obstacle to widening 
collaborative activity in certain strategic areas.
ESI field   % of national research  
 Joint papers  China  UK
Agricultural Sciences 206 2.02 4.00
Biology and Biochemistry 510 1.96 2.14
Chemistry 1117 0.84 3.48
Clinical Medicine 1500 2.54 1.38
Computer Science 676 4.37 8.08
Economics and Business 297 6.76 2.19
Engineering 2524 3.50 8.36
Environment/Ecology 496 3.06 3.77
Geosciences 753 3.73 4.57
Immunology 160 4.01 2.57
Materials Science 786 1.20 6.71
Mathematics 330 1.30 3.52
Microbiology 278 3.56 3.67
Molecular Biology and Genetics 471 3.76 2.93
Neuroscience and Behaviour 286 3.28 1.88
Pharmacology and Toxicology 225 2.54 4.08
Physics 1668 0.25 0.68
Plant and Animal Science 604 7.38 8.18
Psychiatry/Psychology 233 21.8 3.33
Social Sciences general 544 3.48 0.64
Space Science 437 10.16 4.90
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Figure 16. UK–China institutional collaboration
Understanding the impact of China–UK research collaboration
One way to quantify the impact of research is to look at the number of times a set 
of papers is cited by other papers. The most accessible metric for judging impact 
of collaboration is to look at an average citation impact. While this gives a helpful 
comparative indicator, it can sometimes be misleading. It is always the case that a small 
proportion of papers will attract many citations, while a large proportion will attract few 
or no citations (for example, even ten years after publication, about 10 per cent of the UK’s 
papers remain uncited). To overcome the problem of interpretation that this creates, and to 
get insights into the spread of performance, Thomson Reuters developed Impact Profiles™ 
which reveal the spread of weak and excellent performance around the world average 
(Normalised Citation Impact (NCI) = 1.0) and highlight the balance of uncited and cited 
papers.359 
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Figure 17.  Impact Profile™ for papers published by China, the UK and co–authored papers  
 between the two countries (2003–2011) and indexed in journals on Thomson  
 Reuters’ Web of Science360
Accounting for variable population and output rates, these charts show the difference 
between the impact of UK research and that of China. This broadly reflects what we might 
expect: the Chinese national curve exhibits relatively more uncited papers (as shown by the 
column to the left) and low–cited papers (with the left side of the curve above that of the 
UK). The Chinese national curve shows that there is a ‘hump’ of research at or below world 
average, while the UK research curve peaks above world average. But the curve to the right 
hand side reveals that China is also producing a growing body of excellent research that 
is far above world average. In fact the impact of 5 per cent of its ten–year output (43,000 
papers) is more than four times world average. A substantial part of these papers have 
purely domestic authorship, so this higher impact is not attributable solely to international 
collaboration.
When we turn our attention to the curve representing China–UK collaborative research, the 
China–UK collaborative data are slightly better than the UK curve overall, and much better 
than the China curve. The collaborative research output features more uncited papers than 
the UK (24 per cent vs 21 per cent) but similar percentages of low–cited papers. While 
there are relatively fewer papers in the range 0.5 to four times world average than the UK’s 
national output, there are relatively more papers in the high–impact categories (above four 
times world average).
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From this data, we can infer that China gains considerably from joint research across the 
board, and that the UK gains primarily at the high impact end. A critical point is that the UK 
gains access to a large, growing and rapidly–improving body of research which can support 
and influence the rest of its portfolio. Collaboration brings insights not only into what the 
best Chinese researchers have done, but what they are planning to do next.
HIGHLIGHTS OF CHINA–UK JOINT RESEARCH SINCE 2007
1. The Innovation China–UK programme, set up in 2007 with £4.5 million in funding 
from HEFCE, BIS and MOST, supported 72 joint projects and led to £1.9 million in 
match funding from Chinese institutions, 25 joint research papers and 14 patents.
2. In 2008 and 2009, RCUK conducted two energy calls in partnership with MoST 
covering Hydrogen and Fuel Cells and Cleaner Fossil Fuels (£6.6 million and £4.5 
million from RCUK).
3. In 2012, RCUK and MoST launched the China–UK Programme in Global Priorities, 
which aims to facilitate bilateral cooperation between research groups working on 
healthy ageing populations, energy and food security. RCUK and MoST each invested 
£1 million and four projects were funded. 
4. A series of joint calls have been launched since 2008 with the National Natural 
Science of China (NSFC). These include Nanospintronics, Carbon Capture and 
Storage and Smart Grids and Electric Vehicles, with a total of over £8.65 million from 
RCUK plus matched funding from the NSFC. Future calls on sustainable materials for 
infrastructure and the next phase of the China–UK stem cells initiative are planned in 
2014. 
5. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) has supported the following joint activities 
with the UK: solar cells, solar fuels and fuel cells (RCUK invested £2.5 million with 
matched funding from CAS); Synthetic Biology China Partnering Award (BBSRC and 
EPSRC committed £25,000 per award matched by CAS). 
6. There are ongoing efforts to strengthen links between CAS institutes and centres in 
the UK. For example, CAS has recently funded a new centre of excellence to connect 
the John Innes Centre (JIC) with CAS institutes working on plant and microbial 
sciences. 
7. The extensive China–UK engagement on the climate change agenda includes 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between several UK government departments 
and their Chinese counterparts; a joint Technology Strategy Board and EPSRC 
program with MoST to support innovation in sustainable manufacturing; and over 
£24 million in funding from RCUK for joint energy projects with Chinese research 
funders.
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Benchmarking national strategies for collaboration
Data on co–authored research papers highlights one dimension of China’s collaborative 
links with the UK and other countries. But there are many other aspects of a broader 
strategy for innovation collaboration that cannot be captured through bibliometric analysis. 
For instance, there is much to be gained from collaboration between China and the UK on 
innovation in services and creative industries. For example, Nesta is currently collaborating 
on a project with Douban, one of China’s biggest online cultural communities, to explore 
market opportunities for UK creative content in China.
As part of the research for this report, we reviewed the available literature on collaboration 
strategies, and interviewed a targeted selection of research policymakers, funders and 
programme managers in the UK, US, Australia and Germany.
Below we cluster our findings under five headings which reflect important aspects of any 
country’s approach to collaboration with China on research and innovation: 
• Joint research. 
• Strategic frameworks. 
• Trade and business links.
• Influence on Chinese policy.
• Student flows.
This is a complex area, and what we present below is just a starting point, which would 
benefit from more systematic quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Joint research
• In 2012, 11.5 per cent of China’s papers had a US co–author, making the US China’s 
main research collaborator. Research links between the two countries continue to 
steadily increase.
• As described above, the UK has recently passed Japan to become China’s second 
largest research collaborator, but Australia is catching up fast and may overtake it in 
the next few years on extrapolation of current trends. Unlike its UK counterpart, the 
Australian Research Council does not have an office in China. While Australia now 
has a strong overarching strategy of economic collaboration with Asia, it is unclear 
what precise actions have led to this growth in collaboration.
• Germany lags behind other countries on this list in terms of joint published papers, 
However, German research funders and institutes have a strong presence on the 
ground in China and there are several joint Sino–German research centres. Rainer 
Frietsch of Fraunhofer ISI observes that: “Germany has many representatives in 
China: universities, chambers of commerce, federal states, research institutes, and 
companies like VW, BASF and Bayer….Small bricks make a big wall.”361 
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• A China–EU S&T agreement was signed in 1998 and renewed in 2009. The volume 
of collaborative research has steadily increased under the EU’s last three Framework 
Programmes, placing China third, after the US and Russia, in terms of the total 
number of non–EU participants.362 Some have expressed concern that stricter 
eligibility criteria in the forthcoming Horizon 2020 round may reduce levels of China–
EU collaboration. European Commission officials however, insist the changes will 
allow a substantial volume of research to take place, within clearer guidelines.363 
Strategic frameworks
• Few countries publish a single document designed to capture their overall strategy 
towards engagement with China. The Australian government’s white paper, ‘Australia 
in the Asian Century,’ is the closest attempt to do this. Australia, which has a 
smaller population than the city of Shanghai, realises that collaboration across the 
Asia–Pacific region is crucial to its future prosperity.364 Tricia Berman of Australia’s 
Department for Innovation365 suggests that: “Australia is now more mature in its 
relations with China than most. It has got past major concerns such as IPR expressed 
by OECD countries…Engagement, trust and an ongoing rapport are key to creating 
future partnerships.”366
• The US is in an altogether different position. Despite its strong links to China – 
particularly in the economic sphere – the frequency of reports and political rhetoric 
which are critical of aspects of Chinese policy reflect the US’s desire to encourage 
a level playing field and protect its economic advantages. Yet behind the often–
hawkish public debate, US officials work quietly and steadily to strengthen US–China 
collaboration. According to Oliver Chase of the American Chamber of Commerce in 
China, “US officials in China spend a lot of their time telling the Chinese the difference 
between policy and politics in the US.”
• Germany’s strategy towards China is based on manufacturing links and maintaining 
its export markets. According to Wolfgang Crasemann of the Federal Ministry 
of Economy and Technology (BMWI): “Industry is the forerunner in our policy 
considerations.”367 An example of this is the role that Germany played in opposing the 
EU’s planned tariff on imports of Chinese solar panels, fearing that it would harm its 
trade relationship with China.368 
• The UK approach is closer to that of Germany and Australia than the US. 
However, it can occasionally strike a more hawkish note on trade and innovation 
links. For example, a recent parliamentary report from the UK’s Intelligence and 
Security Committee raised concerns about Huawei’s role in the national telecoms 
infrastructure. However, this is unusual: in general, the UK government is vocally 
supportive of more inward investment from Chinese companies.369 
• In addition to RCUK’s China office, which has been operational since 2007, the UK 
has a growing network of Science and Innovation Network representatives and 
specialist IPO attaches in its Embassy and Consulates across China. UKTI and the 
China Britain Business Council work together to provide advice and assistance to 
UK companies looking to do business in China. The two countries convene a bi–
annual ministerial dialogue on science and technology which has recently been 
complemented by an annual official–level innovation dialogue between BIS and 
MOST. 
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Trade and business links
• The EU is China’s largest source of imports and China’s second largest export market, 
after the US.370 Within the EU, Germany is China’s largest trading partner, accounting 
for around 46 per cent of total EU exports to China in 2012.371 A recent briefing by the 
European Council on Foreign Relations argues “At present, there is an almost perfect 
symbiosis between the Chinese and German economies. China needs technology and 
Germany needs markets.”372 
• In 2011, China became the UK’s 7th largest export market for goods. UK exports to 
China totalled £10.54 billion in 2012, a 13.4 per cent increase on 2011, and an increase 
of over 700 per cent since 2002.373 While the UK had a trade deficit with China in 
goods of £21 billion in 2012, it had a trade surplus in services of £1.8 billion.374 Trade 
in services is a promising area for future UK collaboration with China, particularly in 
health, education and finance, all areas where the UK has strengths. According to 
experts there are now 400 Chinese companies in the UK.
• China is Australia’s largest trading partner, and Australia was China’s 11th largest 
export destination and 6th largest origin of imports in 2012.375 However, 70 per cent of 
Australia’s exports to China are raw materials, such as iron ore and coal. This balance 
is recognised as a longer–term problem in Australia, particularly as China’s gradual 
economic slowdown has been reducing demand for raw materials.376 
Inﬂuence on Chinese policy
• US diplomacy and lobbying has a strong influence on Chinese innovation policy. 
Both the first and second amendments to China’s patent law came about after 
pressure from the US.377 China also dropped its overt requirements for government 
departments to only procure products certified as ‘indigenous innovation products’ 
after pressure from foreign governments, led by the US. The US is also the most 
frequent user of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism against China.378 
• The US–China Innovation Dialogue was launched in 2010 to discuss contentious 
issues related to innovation policies and promote best practices. It includes two 
parallel tracks: ministerial–level discussions at the policy level, and an expert group, 
led by Rob Atkinson, head of the Information Technology Industry Foundation, 
and Tsinghua University Professor Xue Lan. The dialogue has become an important 
component of wider US–China economic and trade relations.379 
• The EU’s collective influence on China’s innovation policy is often weakened by the 
lack of unity among its member states. Godement and Parello–Plesner argue that 
China is “happy with having 27 bilateral relationships, in which China nearly always 
has the upper hand.” This lack of cohesion was reflected recently when several 
countries in the EU area criticised the EU trade commissioner for threatening to 
impose tariffs on imports of Chinese solar panels, which led to the tariff being 
substantially reduced. 
• Like the UK and the US, Germany and Australia carry out regular high–level dialogues 
on economic, trade and innovation policy with China. While the outcomes of US–
China dialogues are frequently published, the results of other bilateral dialogues are 
less clear, as little detailed information on the outcomes is made publicly available. 
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• The British Standards Institution (BSI), part of the UK’s innovation infrastructure, 
has been building a relationship with its Chinese counterpart, the Standards 
Administration of China (SAC) for several years. Visits and staff secondments have 
helped develop understanding of each other’s systems, and the BSI’s proposal that 
China be granted permanent membership of the Council of ISO (the International 
Organization for Standardization) was an important step towards the country’s 
integration in the global standards system. The two sides are currently drafting a 
joint agreement that could help harmonise future UK and Chinese standards. David 
Bell, Head of External Policy for BSI thinks this ‘long game’ is worth it: ‘it could be 
hugely influential in opening future trade paths, removing technical barriers to trade 
and giving the UK opportunities for first mover advantage in trade in emerging 
technologies.’380 
Student ﬂows from China
• The US is the first choice destination for Chinese students, hosting a total of 194,029 
in 2011–12, up from 81,000 five years ago.381 
• In the UK, there were 78,715 Chinese students in 2011–12, a 16.9 per cent increase 
on the previous year, making it the second most popular destination for Chinese 
students.382 
• Australia ranks as China’s third most popular student destination, with 75,578 Chinese 
citizens holding student visas in 2011.383 
• Germany has the lowest number of Chinese students, with around 24,000 in 2012.384 
In 2011, the German Academic Exchange Service funded over 3,000 academic 
exchanges between Germany and China.385 
• Germany and Australia recently extended their post–study work visa schemes386 and 
the US allows students to apply for a one–year post–study work visa, if they work in a 
related field. 
• By contrast, the UK closed its post–study work visa scheme to new applicants in 
2012, and its broader stance on reducing migration flows has prompted concern 
in the university sector that applicants from China, India and elsewhere may be 
dissuaded from applying.387 
• UK universities also have a growing presence on the ground in China. Nottingham 
University opened a campus in the east coast city of Ningbo in 2004. Liverpool 
University has partnered with Xi’an Jiaotong University to form an independent 
institution in Ningbo. Queen Mary, University of London has set up the Sino–
British joint degree programme together with the Beijing University of Posts and 
Telecommunications.388 
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Future priorities
This brief and by no means comprehensive survey of how a handful of key countries are 
approaching their research and innovation relationship with China highlights a few lessons 
for the UK. First, it is vital to continue investing in the process of gathering ‘innovation 
intelligence’ on the ground in China, by ensuring we have sufficient representatives who 
can liaise and identify potential Chinese partners, within and beyond the obvious centres 
of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. Second, our analysis of the bibliometric 
data shows that the UK is currently performing well, but this is not a strong predictor of 
future position due to the dynamism of the Chinese system. Third, each county’s distinctive 
strengths and modes of engagement are unique, and while it is important to monitor and 
benchmark the UK’s performance to that of others, the transfer of ‘best practices’ is rarely 
straightforward. Finally, the density and diversity of connections is crucial – successful 
collaboration strategies need to operate in an integrated way across the academic, 
research, commercial, trade and cultural spheres. This is a challenge to which we return in 
the final chapter.
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8: THE REAL RISK EQUATION 
Products made by Strix are used over a billion times a day. As a leading manufacturer of 
thermostatic controls in kettles and other consumer appliances, Strix operates in a sector 
with steep competition. Its drive to introduce disruptive and profitable technologies to this 
market has required them to invest in advanced robotics, and has generated hundreds of 
patents. 
Working in China for well over a decade, Strix has been a target for what CEO Paul Hussey 
calls “the copyists.” As he describes: “They would take our technology and manufacture 
substandard components, with substandard materials and substandard engineering 
embedded in the product. But the price at which they could offer the product was 
substantially less, because they didn’t have the same costs associated with producing 
a very high quality safe product.”389 Frustrated with the damage to their business, Strix 
recently sued these rivals in the Beijing Intermediate Court. And against the odds, they 
won.
The process was difficult, time consuming and expensive. Yet it was in many ways a 
landmark case for a foreign company in China, and for Hussey, a strong validation of the 
positive direction of travel of the Chinese intellectual property regime. While he believes 
the system has matured considerably in the last few years, he is under no illusion about 
the challenge ahead. “One has to see this as a long battle, because one really can’t declare 
victory and then uproot and go home, you really have to be in it for the long haul… And 
I don’t mean going to China once a year on a business trip. I mean moving your senior 
management – I’ve moved half my senior management to Hong Kong or China from the UK 
– that’s a reflection of the commitment I’m making long term in this part of the world. So 
you have to live it, you can’t just talk about it.”390 
While some of China’s bad press on risk is probably deserved, Hussey finds that the focus 
of mainstream media on foreign company experiences creates the sense that there is some 
kind of national conspiracy. “But one forgets this simple point – last year approximately 
90 per cent of all patents registered in China were registered by indigenous Chinese 
companies. In other words, people in China themselves have the most to lose from their 
own IPR system being inadequate.”391 
In five years’ time, Strix research estimates that the Chinese domestic market alone will 
account for 50 per cent of the global market for their products. As a result, they are 
gradually doing more R&D in China. “If the entire process was a hundred steps, whereas 
before 90 per cent would have been done in the UK, that’s more like 40–50 per cent 
now.”392 It is not surprising that Hussey sees China as a massive part of Strix’s future; for 
this company, the risk equation is clear.
Analysis of the risks of doing high–tech business in China is fraught with misperceptions 
and half–truths, as well as evidence of genuine challenges. For this report, we reviewed 
the latest available literature, but also interviewed 14 high–tech British companies 
which, like Strix, have experience of collaborating with counterparts in China. These 14 
companies included a mix of small, medium and large companies in a range of sectors from 
telecommunications to semiconductors. To place their experiences in the wider context of 
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national policies, we then interviewed a range of government agencies in the UK, Germany, 
US and Australia that work to support innovation collaborations with China. Finally, we 
spoke to a number of expert analysts of risk in China.
For companies, a key issue is inevitably the protection of intellectual property and the 
freedom to exploit it. For national governments keen to engage with China for mutual 
benefit, the questions are often ones of international rules and governance. We address 
these areas in turn, with a view to presenting a balanced view of the risk equation.
Risky business?
Paul Hussey’s view was widely shared among our interviewees. “I notice the companies that 
are the best prepared and well organised in China tend to be the luckiest ones.”
But while preparation is key, there are persistent examples of companies with a 
more negative business experience in China. For Simon Knowles, founder of British 
semiconductor company ICERA, operating in China was a rough ride. “Chinese equipment 
companies are sometimes over–focussed on unit cost reduction. Chinese customers 
would often take our carefully–engineered reference designs, downgrade several of the 
components, then demand that we fly a team of engineers to China immediately because 
the system did not work as specified. Going round this loop, often repeatedly, delays new 
product introduction and misses market windows.” He went on to say that “Employee 
loyalty and respect for intellectual property in China are far below European norms today. 
Employees may unexpectedly disappear from your critical project, to re–appear at your 
competitor the very next day, and for surprisingly little financial incentive. It is necessary 
to construct need–to–know barriers within the company, which is an impediment to the 
efficiency of any engineering team.” 
Examples like this are one of the reasons why even multinationals like BP and ARM 
are unwilling to carry out R&D on their cutting edge technologies in China. For small 
companies, the risks can be far greater. 
Progress in the intellectual property regime
China has developed a sophisticated system of IP regulations and a patent law which 
largely meets WTO requirements,393 yet enforcement hasn’t kept pace with improvements 
in the legal framework. The US International Trade Commission estimates that US firms 
doing business in China lost $48.2 billion in sales, royalties and licence fees in in 2009 due 
to IPR infringement.394 While these figures are debateable, the report argues that if China 
enforced IPR at a level comparable to the US, it would generate 923,000 additional jobs in 
the US. 
The amount of litigation handled by Chinese courts is rocketing. Data from China’s 
Supreme People’s Court shows that China’s courts accepted over 87,000395 first instance 
civil IPR cases and over 13,000 criminal cases in 2012, an increase of 46 per cent and 
almost 130 per cent on the previous year respectively.396 These huge jumps in the amount 
of patent litigation come on the back of sustained investment in China’s IPR enforcement 
system, which now has 2,759 IP judges and 420 courts with IP divisions.397 
Despite these improvements, the EU Chamber of Commerce in China argues that the 
damages awarded in IP infringement cases are too small to act as a deterrent. There are 
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also wide variations in enforcement between regions, with much better enforcement in 
first tier east coast cities compared to western and smaller cities.398 This is what led Strix to 
sue copyists in Beijing rather than any other city: “In our experience, the Beijing courts are 
somewhat removed from the practical realities on the ground of local influence and tend to 
render judgments which can be looked at more dispassionately.”399 
Worries about IP protection in China are holding foreign companies back from bringing 
their cutting edge products to China.400 Yet according to law firm Jones Day, “The most 
serious IP problem for foreign business in China is that they often fail to register their IP 
there. China’s reputation of poor IP rights enforcement had led many foreign businesses 
to draw the conclusion that it is not worth it to apply for patent or trademark protection in 
China. These foreign companies have come to regret their earlier decisions.”401 
Ian Harvey from INTIPSA believes that “many Western companies’ problems are self–
inflicted wounds,” because they believe that “we mustn’t sue – it would annoy the 
government.”402 This issue, which was confirmed by several of the interviews we conducted 
with SMEs for this report, is according to Harvey, a misunderstanding. He believes that the 
Chinese government wants companies to use the legal system and gets annoyed when 
they complain about poor IP protection before doing so. 
While past improvements to the Chinese IPR protection system were largely driven by 
pressure from the US, change will increasingly be driven by domestic pressure in the 
future.403 Denis Simon argues that as the government has increasingly come to rely on 
enterprises to drive innovation, Chinese companies have started to voice their demands 
for improved IPR protection. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea all strengthened their IPR 
protections when they moved from low–cost manufacturing to R&D and design, and Simon 
argues that China will be no different.404 
However, there are questions, both within China and abroad, about the role that the patent 
systems of developed countries play in promoting innovation and economic growth. The 
Hargreaves review (2011) of the UK IP system found that the increase in patent filings over 
the past decade has led to a backlog at the UK patent office and created ‘patent thickets’, 
which it defines as ‘an overlapping set of patent rights.’ It finds that both of these problems 
exclude firms from entering the market and inhibit growth.405 To convince China of the 
value of improving its IP system, developed countries should recognise and be open about 
the problems in their own systems. But they could also benefit from a better understanding 
of the Chinese patent system and the reforms that are happening there. Experts believe 
the smaller number of patent rights owners in China gives the government more space 
to enact reforms than would be the case in Western countries. Furthermore, the future 
development of global IP norms may shift from the US to China as the centre of global 
economic power shifts east making a understanding of the Chinese system even more 
important. 
Mitigating IP risks
A number of factors affect the relative level of risk that a high–tech company faces when 
collaborating in China, and a variety of strategies can be deployed to overcome these.
In terms of patent infringement and IP theft, there is clearly a greater risk for companies 
whose products are more easily reverse engineered. As Zhenhui Gou, General Manager 
of the Chinese subsidiary of Lucy Switchgear, a family owned SME that designs and 
manufactures switchegear for electric distribution networks pointed out, “Our industry is a 
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more traditional industry, so a competitor doesn’t need to come to our factory and steal our 
technology, they just need to buy our product and open it up.”406 Here reputation as a high 
quality brand is as important to protecting revenues as a patent “people in the industry 
know the difference between our brand and others, the quality is much higher.”407
There is less risk of impact for those companies with more advanced products and 
processes. Paul Thorning, director of open innovation at the University of Bradford and 
founder of a pharmaceutical start up in China, told us that “it could take a company several 
years to replicate the process for creating our product.” For Steve Cook, Strategy Advisor 
at BP, the position was similar: “BP mostly licences process and process technologies to 
China. Simply having a patent doesn’t enable you to make a process work, you need the 
know how, such as trade secrets, which are not published.”408 
While intellectual property is clearly of huge value, companies reiterated that it was only 
one component of creating value from research and innovation. For Strix, “It is one thing to 
put something on a blueprint, but it’s quite another to manufacture it in mass production to 
a high level of engineering.”409 While Xiangming Xu of East Malling Research believes that 
“even if our IP gets stolen, it’s unlikely that Chinese companies would have the ability to sell 
their products in UK markets immediately.”410 
Global market share in an industry is another factor limiting the impact of IP theft for large 
companies. COO of semiconductor multinational, ARM, Graham Budd is clear that the 
company is committed to a long and successful engagement in China. Yet it remains careful 
about the type of technology it takes into the country. “We don’t feel ready yet to develop 
our ‘crown jewels’ IP in China. However, our business model is self–policing to an extent. 
Our IP is in the hands of many companies. It could easily leak out. But if that happens and 
if a company is looking to be successful in high volume product, they would be mad to try 
and create a product without coming to us for a licence, due to the risk of using unvalidated 
IP, and the risk of shipping an end product created without our engagement and support. 
If an organisation stole our IP and only used it for research or only shipped a few products, 
there would be very little lost revenue due to our royalty business model.”411 
Similarly for Imagination Technologies, a global IP company, which in addition to 
developing and licensing silicon, software and cloud IP also designs and manufactures 
consumer products, in the majority of cases there is a moderately low risk of competitors 
being able to use copies of advanced technologies to compete with them. As part of 
ramping up engagement with China, they licensed technologies to a range of Chinese 
companies including Huawei. Imagination started working in China more than seven years 
ago, and for Tony King–Smith, an Executive Vice President at Imagination, the current 
environment for doing business is “China 2.0.” Chinese companies in the past used to be 
“pretty aggressive” in their efforts to get hold of technology. However, as their interactions 
with the West and other markets increased, the overall commercial operating environment 
has similarly matured considerably. While earlier licensing deals usually were only for older 
generations of their technology, Imagination recently made the decision to license even 
their cutting edge technology in China. “Our industry is global, and the Chinese are heavily 
dependent on Western technologies and markets to be successful. These companies cannot 
afford to be seen as ‘dangerous’ from an IP perspective by the rest of the industry, so we’re 
seeing a much more sophisticated and mature approach to doing business with leading 
Chinese partners now that encourages us to invest more into China.”412 
Some believe that the best way to protect IP assets in China is by not relying too much on 
any single partner or customer in China. Despite efforts to spread intellectual assets, there 
are high–profile cases of trade secret theft in China. American Superconductor Corporation 
(AMSC) supplied power systems and software to the Chinese wind turbine manufacturer 
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Sinovel and is now suing it for $1 billion after it paid an AMSC engineer to steal its source 
code.413 Some believe AMSC should serve as a cautionary tale to companies of how not to 
do business with China: Sinovel accounted for 75 per cent of AMSCs revenues before its IP 
was stolen.414 
Another approach is through investing considerable time in developing long–term, trusting 
relationships with Chinese counterparts.
Graham Budd, COO of ARM clarifies their approach. “We feel that it is more important to 
engage and develop partnerships in China rather than just trying to sell over there. China is 
moving very fast, so you need to engage not just sell, otherwise there is a risk that someone 
else will do what you do cheaper and faster and you will find yourself designed out of the 
process.”415 
Ultimately though, our interviews suggested that the best way for a company to protect 
itself is to stay ahead of their competitors by constantly innovating. Several of our 
interviewees echoed the view of Jenny Norris, research director of the European Marine 
Energy Centre (EMEC): “EMEC’s preferred approach is to stay ahead of the game, to 
ensure that we are the obvious partner to come to and seek assistance from (in the form of 
consultancy). With the difficulties associated with international law, I don’t think we would 
have much faith in our ability to uphold an NDA were it to be abused: at the very least you’d 
end up with a massive bill and no substantial progress, so it’s better to be more proactive 
about it and look to stay ahead in the first place.”416 
Beyond ‘traditional’ forms of IP theft and leakage, a surge in global media reports has 
focused attention on the issue of cybercrime and hacking emanating from China.
Cybersecurity
In a speech to the Asia Society in March 2013, Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor 
to the President said that “Increasingly, US businesses are speaking out about their 
serious concerns about sophisticated, targeted theft of confidential business information 
and proprietary technologies through cyber intrusions emanating from China on an 
unprecedented scale.”417 
A report for the Cabinet Office by the consultancy Detica found that cybercrime costs the 
UK £27 billion/year, £9.2 billion/year418 of which can be attributed to IP theft. However, this 
report has received much criticism for its methodology.419 
Paul Cornish, Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Exeter argues that 
“where the quantified effect of cyber espionage is concerned, the evidence is at its most 
incomplete and flawed and the debate at its most speculative and contentious.” He says 
that while there is a growing amount of evidence of Chinese cyber espionage, “there is, 
as yet, far less clear evidence as to the damage caused by Chinese cyber espionage.”420 
Jason Straight of the risk consultancy Kroll argues that risks to innovative companies 
from cybercrime are overplayed compared to traditional channels for IP theft, “businesses 
need to avert their gaze from high–profile, state–sponsored cyber threats and look at their 
people.”421 
While data security was on the risk agenda of many of the companies we interviewed, most 
suggested that it was not an overriding concern. It is, however, playing a significant role at 
a political level, most prominently in increasingly hawkish US rhetoric on this issue. 
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Innovation collaboration and the national interest
Over the last decade, a growing number of countries, including the UK, have recognised 
the importance of innovation in spurring national economic growth and competitiveness. 
National innovation agencies are proliferating in developed and developing economies as 
governments seek to develop the suite of policies that will help them both collaborate and 
compete in a rapidly developing global system. US think tank ITIF suggest this is resulting 
in a range of ‘good,’ ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ approaches to innovation policy.
“Countries can implement their innovation policies in a win–win, positive–sum fashion that 
simultaneously spurs domestic innovation, creates spillover effects that benefit all countries, 
and encourages others to implement similar win–win policies. But another path countries all 
too often take seeks to realize innovation–based growth through a zero– or negative–sum, 
beggar–thy–neighbor, export–led approach.”422 
For ITIF CEO Rob Atkinson, co–chair of the US–China academic innovation dialogue, 
China’s policies can tend towards the ugly: “China wants to compress a 40–year learning 
process into ten years. The only way for China to achieve this great leap forward is by free 
riding on foreign technologies. Examples include forced technology transfer, indigenous 
innovation product catalogues and IP theft, with key cases ranging from companies such 
as Nortel (a post–bankruptcy report revealed China had been ‘inside’ Nortel systems since 
2000), American Superconductor (trade secret theft) and Ford (where entry into the 
Chinese market required a forced joint venture and construction of R&D lab)”423 
ITIF is working from a US system that has appeared increasingly ‘hawkish’ about 
collaborating with China on research and innovation. According to cyber security expert 
Adam Segal of the Council of Foreign Relations “The slow leaking of stories about 
hacking, and then the deluge of them in the last six months, and the evidence that they 
are connected to China’s S&T plans, this has really changed the environment.” Yet despite 
congressional efforts to limit collaboration in areas sensitive to the national interest, such 
as space, US–China collaboration continues to deepen as described further in Chapter 
Seven.424 
An effective dialogue on innovation policy cannot overlook the role of national innovation 
policies on international competitiveness. Below we consider three areas of concern: 
market access restrictions and the lack of a level playing field, technology transfer 
conditions and technology standards.
Towards a level playing field? 
In its 2013 business confidence survey, the EU Chamber of Commerce found that 45 per 
cent of European companies had missed opportunities in China due to market access 
restrictions.425 Many of these restrictions are legally defensible because China isn’t yet a 
signatory to the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement.426 The EU Chamber of 
Commerce calculates that public procurement in China represents over 20 per cent of the 
economy – potentially a huge market for European companies if access to information and 
transparency were improved and contracts were awarded fairly.427 The United States Trade 
Representative’s latest report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance states that despite 
improvements over the past decade, subsidies, market access barriers, and discrimination 
against foreign companies all continued to be issues of concern in 2012.428 
A recent case that generated much discussion among policy communities was the 
indigenous innovation product accreditation scheme. As outlined in ITIF’s report The 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly, eligibility for preferences under the original programme 
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required products to have Chinese proprietary intellectual property rights and an original 
registration location of the product trademark within the territory of China. While 
domestic content is often a requirement of national procurement policies, the inclusion 
of IP ownership requirements lay far beyond standard practice. For ITIF, the wind energy 
equipment industry is the best example of the result of similar policies, which led foreign 
wind turbine producers’ share of the Chinese market ‘crater’ from 75 per cent in 2004 to 
15 per cent in 2009.429 Most recent figures show that in 2012 it fell further to around 7.5 per 
cent.430 The 70 per cent local content requirement on wind turbines was removed in 2009 
as a result of US lobbying,431 but this has been viewed as a largely symbolic gesture, as by 
that time Chinese manufacturers had already cornered the market.432 
Subsidies to Chinese manufacturers have also been a large source of tension between 
China and developed countries. While it is difficult to get a full picture of the subsidies 
on offer, as many are given by local governments in the form of free land and tax 
deductions, it is undeniable that Chinese industry has benefited hugely from them, with 
some estimating that they account for as much as 30 per cent of China’s total industrial 
output.433 However, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, many countries are reluctant to take 
action against China, fearing retaliations in the form of tariffs on their own exports to 
China. The US is more willing to place tariffs on Chinese products, such as solar panels, but 
has suffered retaliation in the form of tariffs on its own exports of polysilicon to China,434 
precisely the outcome that EU countries worry about. 
Technology transfer: at a fair price?
China’s WTO commitments prohibit it from making technology transfer a requirement 
of market access.435 However, in recent years Westinghouse (nuclear reactors), Kawasaki 
(high–speed rail) and GE (avionics) have all transferred core technologies to Chinese 
partners to gain access to the Chinese market. 
To take one of these examples, Westinghouse, the US–Japanese nuclear reactor 
manufacturer, agreed to transfer over 75,000 technical documents to its Chinese partner in 
order to win a contract for the construction of its AP1000 nuclear reactor in China.436 Jack 
Allen, president of Westinghouse Asia, believes that even with the technical information, 
China won’t be able to compete with Westinghouse in the next few years. He also argues 
that past giveaways of technology have led to relationships with other countries which 
have lasted 20 years. Yet already in early 2013 China started marketing its own version of 
Westinghouse’s reactor, the CAP1400, to international clients in South Africa.437 
Among the companies we interviewed, decisions about technology transfer were taken 
on a purely commercial basis. As China’s absorptive capacity increases, the nature of 
technology transfer is developing. BP told us that in strategic industries, “the requirements 
are becoming more and more onerous. We are asked to train staff, co–develop IP and share 
future technology plans.”438 However while this is a feature of working with China, it is just 
as much an issue in other places around the world, for example the Middle East.
Companies like these are often criticised for giving away their technologies, however GE 
and Westinghouse argue that they know what they are doing and have built precautions 
into their joint ventures and technology transfer agreements.439 Indeed, Chinese officials 
feel that these agreements generally haven’t given China the cutting edge technologies it 
desires, as many companies refuse to bring their most advanced technologies to China.440 
National governments are likely to have a far longer–term viewpoint of these decisions 
than companies. As Rainer Frietsch of Fraunhofer ISI argues “Policymakers and businesses 
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have different reasons for collaborating with China. Policymakers have more general goals 
concerned with social needs and benefits for society, whereas companies have to think of 
their own benefit and performance. It’s simply a different game.”
Standards: from going it alone to global engagement?
There are over 15 million iPhones registered on the China Mobile network and all of them 
are limited to a 2G signal.441 This is because in its 9th Five Year Plan, China committed to 
developing its own 3G standard442 and today China Mobile uses the proprietary TD–SCMA 
standard, which isn’t supported by Apple. 
The USTR notes that “China seems to be actively pursuing the development of unique 
requirements, despite the existence of well–established international standards, as a means 
for protecting domestic companies from competing foreign standards and technologies.”443 
It lists several areas which China is pursuing standards in: cars, mobile phone batteries, 
RFID technology and telecommunications, among others. Examples of standards 
developed in China include WAPI (wireless internet), TD–SCMA (3G) and TD–LTE (4G).
In China’s drive for indigenous innovation James McGreggor notes that “With the 
government controlling standards, certification and testing regimes can be formidable 
tools for protectionism.” However, others believe that China’s standards policies need to 
be understood as part of China’s development strategy which it is using to catch up with 
high income countries444 and Dan Breznitz argues that standards have been most effective 
as a trade tool to reduce royalty payments on foreign IP.445 While early work in standard 
setting wasn’t very successful technically, China is now an active participant in international 
standard setting.446 
Positive sum games
For many companies, as in the case of Strix at the start of this chapter, China is simply 
‘too big to ignore.’ There are no doubt increased risks of operating in such a vast, dynamic 
and sometimes chaotic system. But despite these, most companies recognise that 
these are inevitable features of a maturing economy. The nature and level of risk varies 
considerably by industry, by size of company, by national economy and also by region 
within China. Monolithic strategies to counteract these risks are unlikely to be effective 
and smarter communication from government which is both tailored, and makes use of all 
available intelligence, will help companies make a more accurate assessment of the risks of 
engagement.
Innovative companies recognise better than most that without some risk, there is little 
reward. Intellectual property is only as valuable as one’s capacity to exploit it and stay 
ahead of the competition. While our interviews confirmed that perceptions of risk put 
some companies off taking their cutting edge products to China or carrying out advanced 
R&D there, we would argue that the greatest risk for companies is of focussing too much 
on these downsides, and missing out on the enormous opportunities that China presents. 
For national governments, China is also too big to ignore and is already having a more 
tangible influence on structures, policies and standards for innovation. Some argue that 
greater pressure is required to encourage China to look beyond its national interests and 
confirm to international norms. But again, the unparalleled scale of the opportunity from 
collaboration with China – for the UK and others – makes the risk equation relatively easy 
to solve.
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Thirty years ago, in 1983, China was shaking off the last vestiges of the Cultural Revolution. 
Its per capita GDP of $223 placed it on a par with Ethiopia,447 and over 90 per cent of the 
population was living on less than $2 a day.448 The first batch of university students for over 
a decade had just graduated,449 270,000 students had been admitted in that cohort, 0.03 
per cent of China’s population at the time. And an influx of foreign investment was just 
beginning to transform the Special Economic Zones, which had recently been established 
in the southern cities of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen.450 
Fast forward 30 years to 2013, and the country is almost unrecognisable. China is now 
the second largest economy in the world. It produces almost 13 per cent of the world’s 
scientific papers and has 25 per cent of its R&D workforce, and over six million of its 
students will graduate this year from higher education.451 China’s increasingly sophisticated 
innovation system has succeeded in combining all of that home grown skill and knowledge 
with foreign technologies to build the world’s fastest supercomputer, send astronauts into 
space and pioneer the Beidou Satellite Navigation System.
And what if we now cast our minds forward 30 years? In the year 2043, China will be only 
seven years away from becoming a ‘world leader in science and technology’, the target set 
by the 2006 MLP. It will have been the world’s largest economy for well over 20 years,452 
and an ‘innovation oriented society’ for over a decade. But the China of 2043 will also face 
acute challenges: almost a third of its population will be over 60; its environment is likely to 
have deteriorated as a consequence of climate change; and its broader social and political 
trajectory is unclear. 
However the narratives of China’s future described in our opening chapter combine, 
overlap and play out – and whatever surprises emerge along the way – there is little doubt 
that China’s role as an innovation power will be even more pivotal in 2043 than it is today. 
For the UK, the choice is not whether to engage more deeply with the Chinese system, but 
how.
UK policymakers have long recognised the need for a closer relationship with China on 
research and innovation. A headline conclusion of this report is that China’s innovation 
system is advancing so rapidly in multiple directions, and is now so absorptive, that the UK 
needs to develop a more ambitious and tailored strategy, able to maximise opportunities 
and minimise risks across the diversity of its innovation links to China.
Prime Minister David Cameron has spoken frequently in recent months about the ‘global 
race’ that is now underway. The notion of a race is helpful in focusing political, media and 
public attention on the competitive challenges that the UK now faces. But it can perhaps 
imply that there is some kind of fixed prize or absolute advantage at stake, rather than 
the comparative advantages, and mutually beneficial niches, which make up networks of 
international trade, research and innovation. 
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Charles Leadbeater and James Wilsdon summarised this argument in the introduction to 
The Atlas of Ideas, which drew on Demos’ 2007 China study and linked reports on India 
and South Korea: 
“The rise of innovation from China, India and Korea is feeding a climate of anxiety in Europe 
and the US that could lead to defensive responses…(It) will inevitably challenge our position 
in knowledge–based industries. More knowledge jobs will go offshore. Research and 
development will become more international. In the long run, China, India and Korea will 
start to earn more from exploiting their own intellectual property, and our share of income 
from intellectual property may decline. However, it would be extremely short–sighted to 
view these developments purely as a competitive threat…
Innovation in China will continue to accelerate development and raise incomes, creating a 
larger market for British services...If more researchers are doing more science, with ever 
more powerful computers, this increases the likelihood of meeting the global challenges we 
face: from low–carbon innovation to vaccines against pandemics. More brains, working on 
more ideas, in more places around the world, are good news for innovation.”453 
In the global innovation race, it is clear that there can be more than one winner. The 
question we explore in this final chapter is how can China and the UK become closer 
running mates, more effectively playing off each other’s strengths?
How much has changed since 2007? Ten key findings 
One striking change since the 2007 Demos report is the extent to which the quantity and 
quality of evidence, data and international analysis of the Chinese innovation system has 
improved. There is now less hyperbole about numbers of engineering graduates or the 
volume of R&D investment, and more balanced, fine–grained discussion of the progress and 
obstacles that China is encountering on its path to becoming a more innovative economy.
In this report, we set out to understand the latest developments and future prospects for 
Chinese innovation, with a view to developing a more strategic framework for China–UK 
collaboration. To do this, we drew on over 600 reports and articles published in the last five 
years, we commissioned and analysed new quantitative datasets, and we conducted expert 
interviews with policymakers, academics, business leaders and research funders. Below we 
summarise our ten most significant findings:
1. China is an absorptive state, increasingly adept at attracting and profiting from 
global knowledge and networks. China’s growing innovation system has succeeded 
in combining rapidly improving home–grown capabilities and infrastructure with 
foreign technologies and knowledge to build the world’s fastest supercomputer, send 
astronauts into space and pioneer the Beidou Satellite Navigation System. These 
examples suggest that what China’s President Xi Jinping terms “innovation with 
Chinese characteristics” will not be a straightforward path from imported to home–
grown innovation, but a messier process in which the lines between Chinese and non–
Chinese ideas, technologies and capabilities are harder to draw.
Characterising China as an absorptive state helps us to understand its current phase of 
development: that the systemic conditions for research and innovation have reached a 
stage where ideas can be effectively absorbed and exploited, with increasingly dense 
and targeted networks to enable this. But it also helps us assess the prospects for future 
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development: absorption will remain a core strand of national research and innovation 
policy, and Chinese firms’ impressive ability to rapidly absorb and re–innovate, while 
adding novelty and value to ideas and technologies in the process, is crucial to 
understanding their competitiveness. 
2. Accelerating the shift to a more innovative economy remains a core priority of 
China’s new leadership, yet equally important is a new focus on quality, efficiency 
and evaluation. A policy focus since the early 1990s on investment and growth has 
propelled China into the top ranks of global innovation, but the process has been 
inefficient and these policies are now being complemented by a growing focus on 
efficiency, quality, coordination and evaluation. This trajectory of reform is likely to be 
consolidated in the 2016 13th Five Year Plan.
3. The exceptional growth trajectory of China’s research base continues, but has not yet 
been matched by similar leaps in quality. Growth in output is pervasive throughout 
the system, both in large fields such as engineering and in newer fields such as 
biomaterials, which grew 15–fold in the last decade. Impact remains below world 
average in most areas, but is close to that benchmark in a number of fields, including 
engineering and mathematics, and consistently above average in agriculture. The 
strengths of established research economies like the UK are relatively stable from year 
to year, while China’s are changing at an unprecedented rate. This requires a cautious 
approach to interpreting strengths and weaknesses. Spikes of excellence and pools of 
mediocrity can be hidden among the averages.
4. Research and innovation is still highly concentrated on China’s east coast, but diverse 
models of innovation are visible among east coast hotspots. While some second 
tier inland cities such as Chengdu and Wuhan have benefited from government and 
multinational investment in innovation, well over two–thirds of all patents were granted 
to applicants on the east coast in 2011. In addition, the east coast accounted for over 
60 per cent of China’s publication output. Yet among the eastern hotspots of Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou, there are contrasting innovation models. While the central 
government sets the overall policy context, targets and evaluation metrics, there is a 
considerable degree of autonomy in how to deliver on these goals in different places, 
leading to experimentation through different interpretations of national policies.
5. Over the last five years, an expanding tier of Chinese multinationals have become 
visible in global rankings of firm–level innovation. Both Baidu and Tencent appear in 
the top 50 of Forbes’ list of most innovative companies and ZTE applied for more PCT 
patents than any other company in the world in 2012. China has benefited considerably 
from the fragmentation and modularisation of global production, which has allowed 
its enterprises to specialise within particular niches of product and service value 
chains. Businesses are responsible for almost–three quarters of China’s R&D spend, but 
progress towards an enterprise–led innovation system has been inhibited by the slow 
pace of reform in state–owned enterprises. 
6. Previously regarded as a weakness, the quality and speed of China’s capacity for 
incremental re–innovation is now an important competitive asset. Sophisticated 
manufacturing networks excel in absorbing, adapting, prototyping and market testing 
new products and technologies at speed. ‘Shanzhai’ methods of production previously 
referred only to substandard imitation, but as former shanzhai companies have 
developed disruptive products, this method of innovation is of growing international 
interest as a distinctive way of adding value. These approaches are not only prevalent 
in manufacturing, but also in the digital and creative industries.
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7. After three decades of rapid economic growth, debate in China is intensifying about 
how to direct innovation towards social and environmental goals. Environmental 
and health concerns are prompting a sharper focus on low–carbon and sustainable 
innovation and the government is investing heavily in low–carbon cities, renewable 
energy and energy efficiency programmes. A more proactive and vocal civil society 
is at the forefront of growing calls for social innovation. More demanding Chinese 
consumers are driving new types of user-driven innovation, a process which will 
intensify as domestic consumption takes over from investment as the main driver of 
China’s economic growth.
8. Our new analysis shows that in 2011, the UK overtook Japan to become second only 
to the US in the number of its joint research publications with China. The UK has 
increased its share of China’s collaborative activity while other EU countries have 
declined. This is an encouraging sign but a weak predictor of future performance, 
owing to the speed of change within the Chinese system. For any country seeking to 
collaborate with China, ensuring a density and diversity of connections will be crucial, 
spanning the academic, research, commercial, trade and cultural spheres. 
9. There is no perfect formula for high impact collaborations with China. There is very 
little evidence available on the effectiveness and economic impact of different models 
of support for international innovation collaboration. Each county’s strengths and 
modes of engagement are unique, and while it is important to monitor and benchmark 
the UK’s performance against that of other countries, and learn from other countries’ 
experience, the transfer of ‘best practices’ in collaboration is rarely straightforward. For 
instance the US and German approaches to collaborating with China are frequently 
held up as models for the UK to emulate. However, the UK’s economy and military 
might is substantially different from that of the US and its manufacturing base 
contrasts with the one which forms the foundation of the Sino–German relationship.
10. The greatest ‘China risk’ for innovative companies is focussing too heavily on 
downside risks, and missing out on the opportunities that China presents. Hawkish 
perspectives on Chinese innovation highlight the ‘dark side’ of China’s absorptive state: 
international flows of ideas and technology resulting from IP theft, forced technology 
transfer and hacking. But innovative firms recognise that without some risk, there is 
little reward. Intellectual property is only as valuable as one’s capacity to exploit it 
and stay ahead of the competition. The increasingly absorptive Chinese system brings 
both risks and opportunities for businesses, universities and others seeking to work 
with and in China. These risks need to be managed with care, but they should not be 
over–emphasised to the extent that they eclipse a far greater risk – that of failing to 
participate fully and benefit from the next phase of China’s growth.
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A more strategic approach to China–UK collaboration
President Xi has outlined his vision for a new partnership between the major powers. 
While the UK may not have the military or economy the scale of the US, or the geopolitical 
significance of Russia, it remains a major power in research. With less than 1 per cent of the 
world’s population, the UK produces 8 per cent of the world’s publications, 14 per cent of 
highly–cited papers and 19.8 per cent of papers with over 1,000 citations. The UK’s strong 
performance has been maintained in recent years, despite flat levels of public funding for 
research since 2010, as the UK, like other countries, has dealt with the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis.
Figure 18: China and UK: comparing the productivity of research systems454
The UK’s innovation system is also highly internationalised and attractive to foreign R&D 
investment, with firms more likely to be active in foreign markets than many European 
counterparts and an unusually high proportion of R&D funded from abroad.455 Like any 
country, its system is not perfect: Nesta research has shown that investment in innovation 
by UK–based firms has fallen since the global financial crisis,456 and the proportion of 
government support directed towards development remains low compared the USA, 
Germany and Finland. 
Both China and the UK have much to gain from a deeper and more strategic set of 
connections across their innovation systems – from accessing new markets, to exploiting 
each other’s’ capabilities and facilities, to collectively shaping the future norms of 
the global innovation system. A first step is to assess the current health of China–UK 
collaborations. While this report has made useful progress here, it also shows that the UK 
needs to get better at articulating, demonstrating and evaluating high value approaches, 
and aligning future strategies with these. 
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As we describe in Chapter Seven, links across the academic research base are strong, 
with a growing volume and share of co–authored publications. China and the UK have 
also enjoyed success over the past five years with various collaborative research schemes, 
which have combined the best of a researcher–led ‘bottom–up’ system with greater ‘top–
down’ prioritisation. The expansion of the FCO/BIS Science and Innovation Network in 
China, and the presence of a small RCUK team in Beijing, have helped to make China–UK 
collaboration more targeted and strategic.
Analysis of the impact of joint research showed that China gains considerably from 
collaborations with the UK, and that the UK gains at the high impact end. The bibliometric 
data in this report provides many useful insights into academic research links, but it also 
highlights the lack of equivalent indicators with which to assess the wider China–UK 
relationship in innovation and the value that this creates. Tools and metrics for assessing 
research collaboration at one end of the spectrum, and international trade flows at the 
other, are very well developed. But there is a ‘missing middle’ in terms of measuring and 
evaluating the value chain connections that comprise global innovation partnerships. 
There are no proven methods for determining the greatest areas of strategic opportunity 
for collaboration. Australian government analysis highlights China as a strategic research 
partner since China’s research strengths are generally in areas of Australian weakness 
and vice versa. Other countries may prefer to collaborate only in areas of mutual 
excellence. For the UK, a ‘strategic’ area of collaboration could be materials science, 
where China’s research base is already strong. However, thinking long term, some might 
suggest it is strategic to collaborate with China on biomedical science, where the UK is 
far stronger, despite pockets of excellence in China (e.g. Fudan University), but where 
China’s large and rapidly growing research base could help scale up UK activity and 
future commercial opportunities. But at a time when the UK is adopting more targeted 
industrial and technology policies, there are more potential synergies with the Chinese 
approach to strategic prioritisation than at any point over the past 30 years. For example, 
David Willetts, the UK’s Minister for Universities and Science, has highlighted ‘eight great 
technologies’ where Britain has distinctive research capabilities and is well placed to take 
advantage of emerging markets.457 These are big data, space, robotics and autonomous 
systems, synthetic biology, regenerative medicine, agri–science, advanced materials and 
energy; domains which are also strengthening fast within the Chinese system. 
China–UK collaborative research and innovation can only flourish within an open, trusted 
and transparent economic and regulatory system. As we discuss in Chapter Eight, there 
are undoubted risks of working in and with a system that is still developing. The nature 
and level of this risk varies considerably by industry, by size of company and by region 
within China. Some companies are clearly discouraged from working with China because of 
concerns such as IP protection and cybersecurity. But as the Judge Business School’s Peter 
Williamson argues, the risks of not engaging with China are greater still: “The real race is all 
about exploiting quicker and faster. We always look at data on loss and technology leakage 
and forget to assess the value of missed opportunities!...This conservatism in thinking has 
not kept up with the reality of global value chains.”458 
Ministers and officials in China’s MoST and the UK’s BIS are aware that many policies and 
incentives for innovation lie beyond their formal remits, in other departments, in businesses 
and across the wider economy. Debates are ongoing in both China and the UK about how 
to design and deliver innovation policies that can maximise quality and effectiveness.459 
For both governments, processes such as the China–UK economic and financial dialogue, 
the Joint Commission on Science and Technology and the Innovation Policy Dialogue are 
important routes to improving trade flows, market access and IP protection across the 
Chinese, UK and EU systems.
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Four recommendations
Building on the analysis of this report, we end with four practical recommendations for 
ways in which China–UK innovation links can be strengthened to mutual advantage:
1. The UK should develop a new five–year strategy for China–UK collaboration in 
research and innovation.
Work towards this strategy should begin now, but 2016 would be the ideal time to 
publish it, in order to take account of new policies in China’s 13th FYP, and the 2015 
post–election Spending Review in the UK. The strategy should encompass the full 
breadth of potential innovation links between the two systems, from research through 
to the commercialisation, demonstration and scaling phases of new technologies. 
Some programmes should envisage a horizon of decades rather than years, and this 
strategy should be fully embedded in a long–term plan for innovation–led economic 
growth in the UK. Stable long–term investments and incentives should help experimental 
approaches to collaboration flourish. On the UK side, this process will require the active 
involvement of the Technology Strategy Board and a wide range of industrial and 
business partners in addition to BIS and RCUK.
2. The UK should develop more sophisticated methods and metrics for identifying 
China–UK innovation opportunities and for evaluating impact.
The strategy should look beyond readily measurable research performance and 
patenting data to understand China’s evolving specialisms. It should explore how 
UK companies can better engage with China’s strengths in developing, iterating and 
scaling technologies. The UK should develop approaches to supporting ecosystems 
of collaboration rather than individual companies. The UK’s ‘eight great technologies’ 
should form the basis of a mapping exercise to determine specific China–UK 
complementarities, which should feed into the five–year strategy. Bibliometric data 
should be used to expand and diversify research collaborations, by developing a data 
resource for UK researchers, identifying the range of Chinese universities where they 
can find relevant capacity and competence. One of the strengths of UK innovation 
policy is the high degree of openness and debate about the effectiveness of different 
approaches. Much equivalent debate and analysis takes place on the Chinese side, 
but is often difficult to access online. The UK government should encourage Chinese 
counterparts to promote access to data and analysis on innovation policy in the same 
way the UK has on the gov.uk website.
3. Expand the China–UK innovation policy dialogue to include a new bilateral expert 
group, able to undertake in–depth analysis to inform ministerial meetings
China and the UK should expand their existing innovation policy dialogue to establish 
a group of Chinese and UK experts in research, innovation and industrial policy, able 
to explore themes relevant to collaboration and provide input and advice to official 
discussions. This group could analyse emerging policies and what they mean for each 
country, evaluate programmes and methods used to support collaboration, and assess 
Chinese and UK strengths and weaknesses for areas of complementarity. Crucially, 
the work of the group should be published, to inform public debate on UK–China 
collaboration.
The new expert group would monitor, conduct research and report publicly on major 
areas of interest to the China–UK innovation relationship. With a strong focus on 
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collaborative opportunities, the group would analyse emerging policies and what they 
mean for the each country, evaluate programmes and methods used to support China–
UK collaboration, and analyse Chinese and UK strengths and weaknesses to identify 
areas of complementarity. Focused analysis could also be undertaken under priority 
themes spanning research and innovation, for example:
• Ageing and healthcare: Both countries face the challenge of caring for an expanding 
elderly population with a dwindling workforce. Innovations in health technology, and 
systemic approaches to transformation could be explored.
• Smart and sustainable cities: China has been investing heavily in smart and eco–
cities, and efforts have been made to match Chinese demand to UK strengths 
in design, construction and big data. But this is an area that can only grow in 
importance given the pace of urbanisation in China.
• Creative industries: China is now making significant investments in cultural 
institutions and creative industries, and is a huge potential market for the UK. 
Creative industries are an area of great strength for UK innovation and there are 
considerable unexploited opportunities for collaboration around for instance cluster 
development and intangible investments in innovation.
4. Further boost the UK’s presence and capacity in China to coordinate innovation 
diplomacy and collaboration for greatest economic and social impact. 
The UK needs to invest further to ensure it can sustain the full range of activities 
required for an effective approach to innovation diplomacy that will unlock long–term 
economic opportunities for the UK. This will require brokers and intermediaries capable 
of supporting a full spectrum of relationships. They should recognise when to support 
individual or supply chain–based collaborative efforts and when to shift attention to 
transforming the overarching policy environment. They also need to ensure better 
coordination between UK partners in China. As the global innovation system develops, 
the UK should design more targeted policies to increase its own capacity to absorb, 
develop and exploit knowledge as well as to generate it. The proposed expert group 
should work closely with UK representatives on the ground to gather data and identify 
opportunities and draw lessons from effective practices.
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